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Abstract 
Behavioral and managerial biases can occur among corporate executives that lead to suboptimal 
decision making and outcomes for the shareholders. In the first essay, I study how the personal networks 
of CEO affect the performance of the firm in the context of IPO. I find that CEOs at higher social 
hierarchical positions can allow managerial entrenchment and prevent dismissal. The findings show that 
influential CEOs are associated with higher IPO underpricing, lower likelihood of positive offer price 
revision, and lower likelihood of wealth creation for the pre-IPO shareholders. In the second essay, I 
explore how the social connections between bidder and bidder advisors affect M&A outcomes. I show 
that the M&A deals with a bidder-bidder financial advisor connection exists have a lower CAR at 
announcement than the deals without such connections. I also show that M&A deals advised by 
personally connected financial advisor are more likely to complete but are executed less efficiently in 
terms of time to resolution. I find evidence that both the bidder CEO and the financial advisor receive 
higher cash bonus and advisor fees, respectively, when there are bidder-bidder financial advisor 
connections exist. Behavioral bias can also occur among individuals and lead to asset bubbles, especially 
in an environment with widely available credit and increased wealth inequality. In the third essay, using 
an experimental approach, I study how wealth inequality, leverage, and the effect that people trying to 
keep up with the status benchmark, which is so called “Joneses effect”, affect the asset bubbles. I find that 
unequal initial endowments and the presence of a Joneses effect lead to substantial overpricing as 
compared to situations where only unequal initial endowment or both factors are absent.  
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Chapter 1 
CEO Network Centrality and IPO Performance 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the link between the outcomes of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
and the personal social network of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) leading the firm at the time of the 
IPO. We build on fast growing literature that deals with the importance of social ties – such as shared past 
employment, shared educational overlaps or joint top positions in social clubs – in finance. So far, financial 
research has documented both benefits and costs of such connections. Personal ties facilitate transfer of 
information among corporate decision makers, which leads to more efficient loan contracting (Engelberg, 
Gao, and Parsons, 2012), better analyst performance (Cohen, Malloy, and Frazzini, 2010), improved 
portfolio manager performance (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008), greater M&A synergies (Cai and 
Sevilir, 2012), and overall better corporate performance (Fracassi, 2014). On the other hand, inter-personal 
connections have been found to interfere with optimal corporate governance and monitoring of managers 
(Fracassi and Tate, 2012), to increase transaction costs (Cai, Walkling, and Yang, 2015), as well as to lead 
to collusion among contracting managers at the expense of investors (Ishii and Xuan, 2014).  
In the context of IPOs, finance studies so far have documented large benefits due to social ties. Cooney, 
Madureira, Singh, and Yang (2015) find that investment banks are more likely to be included in the IPO 
underwriting syndicate, and are more likely to serve in a leading role within the syndicate, if bankers have 
bilateral social links to the IPO firm managers. The linked investment banks also receive higher 
compensation and larger IPO share allocation. At the same time, though, linked underwriters are also able 
to generate greater wealth gains for the pre-IPO shareholders (the gains on the shares those investors retain 
significantly exceed losses due to underpricing). Chuluun (2015) shows that IPOs underwritten by 
investment banks that occupy more central positions in the overall bank network, as well as banks that work 
with partners with previous industry experience, are associated with higher likelihood of large positive IPO 
subscription price revisions, as well as with higher short-run IPO stock returns. 
Our paper builds on the previous IPO-related research, but unlike the effect of bilateral social links 
(Cooney et al., 2015), our focus is on the overall position of CEOs within the full network of all business 
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decision makers - officers and directors of both public and private firms worldwide. Our approach allows 
us to capture the concept of social hierarchy. Bilateral ties often do not have an equal impact on the 
connected parties. People who are in higher social hierarchical positions have superior opportunities to 
transmit, gather, and control information, making such individuals more influential and powerful (e.g. 
Mizruchi and Potts 1998). We follow graph theory studies (Proctor and Loomis, 1951; Sabidussi, 1966; 
Freeman, 1977; Bonacich, 1972) that establish that social network centrality – a set of measures that 
characterizes the overall position of an individual within a network – describes the personal ability to 
influence information flows as well as contractual outcomes (e.g. Padgett and Ansell, 1993; Jackson, 2010). 
In contrast to previous studies based on bilateral ties, we are able to capture the ability of the CEO to affect 
information flows that pass through the entire network, and influence others even if no prior link exist. We 
focus on two centrality measures commonly utilized in social network research: degree centrality (the 
number of direct links between the CEO and any other members of the network) that assesses the personal 
network size, as well as eigenvector centrality that evaluates the relevance of the personal network (by 
giving greater weight to well-connected individuals linked to the CEO). Both of these measures have been 
associated with greater individual influence and power (e.g. Mizruchi and Potts 1998). Consequently, we 
utilize the measures of CEO influence and power to analyze the IPO outcomes to answer the following 
questions: Are IPOs lead by well-connected CEOs associated with greater or lower underpricing? Do 
underwriters of IPOs with central CEOs tend to adjust subscription prices prior to the IPO launch date? 
And, ultimately, do initial pre-IPO owners gain or lose during IPOs managed by central CEOs? 
Our emphasis on the centrality within individual networks (based on nearly 800,000 business 
executives and board members of worldwide public and private firms, tracked by BoardEx database) is also 
conceptually different from studies that examine the effects of overall firm connectedness – that is, a 
position of a firm in the overall network of companies, typically based on board overlaps. The key 
difference is that more central firms should unambiguously generate benefits for the investors from the 
positions of higher influence and power. Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) show that high-centrality firms 
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have superior accounting performance, Chuluun, Prevost, and Puthenpurackal (2014) link high firm 
centrality to lower loan costs and overall improved debt contracting, and Chuluun (2015) finds that more 
central underwriters are associated with more valuable IPO outcomes. However, individual managers may 
utilize their higher influence and power derived from more central network positions both for firm and 
personal benefits. Fogel, Jandik, and McCumber (2015) show that high-centrality CFOs tend to negotiate 
debt contracts that benefits their firms in the form of lower loan spreads and less restrictive covenant 
structures. On the other hand, El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015) document that high-centrality CEOs of 
acquiring firms tend to launch M&A deals that benefit CEOs (in terms of higher pecuniary and non-
pecuniary benefits), but generate losses to the bidder shareholders. El-Khatib et al. (2015) further find that 
high-centrality status enables CEOs to increase entrenchment, and mitigate both internal and external 
monitoring and disciplining of their activities. Consequently, the ultimate impact of CEO centrality on IPO 
outcomes examined in our study is an empirical issue.1 
There are several reasons CEO centrality should affect IPO outcomes. Financial literature (e.g. Chava 
and Purnanandam, 2009; Graham, Harvey, and Puri, 2013) has documented that CEOs are the main firm 
decision makers whose actions have the greatest impact on firm performance. The CEOs of IPO firms 
should have even greater influence on their firms, because IPO companies tend to be relatively young and 
small. IPO research ever since Rock (1986) has shown that information asymmetry between IPO insiders 
and outside shareholders is positively associated with the magnitude of IPO underpricing (i.e. the stock 
return on the IPO first trading day). High information asymmetry makes investments by outsiders riskier, 
creating the need for higher underpricing in order to induce outside investor participation in the IPO. Since 
greater network influence should allow CEOs superior access to information and better ability to 
communicate information (Burt, 2011; Jackson, 2010; Newman, 2010), CEO centrality can reduce the 
                                                          
1  Another difference between previous research on firm centrality and our focus on individual networks is the 
computational complexity. Firm networks typically contain at most several thousands of nodes, and thus firm 
centralities can be computed relatively quickly. On the other hand, individual networks involve hundreds of thousands 
of nodes connected by many millions of links, making centrality computation very high computer memory-intensive. 
For example, eigenvector centrality calculations for the network on links that exist in 2012 takes more than three days 
to converge. 
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information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. High-centrality CEOs may also be 
considered more trustworthy information sources, as networks facilitate information filtering, screening 
and monitoring (Burt 1997, 2005, 2011; Nahapiet and Ghosal, 1998). Next, network centrality may 
facilitate reputation effects via voluntary bonding of highly central individuals, because networks allow 
easier sanctioning of negative behavior and creating social liabilities (Boot et al., 1993; Burt, 2005; Brass 
and Labianca, 2006). All of the above arguments imply that IPOs lead by well-connected CEOs should be 
less risky due to a lower degree of information asymmetry, and as such associated with smaller 
underpricing. On the other hand, high-centrality managers may be isolated from monitoring and market 
discipline, allowing them to pursue activities that enrich managers at the expense of shareholders. El-Khatib 
et al. (2015) find that highly central bidder CEOs are less likely to be fired after value-destroying 
acquisitions, and that they use their superior access to information to benefit from insider trades – especially 
inside selling.2 These results suggest that well-connected CEOs may have tendencies to get engaged in self-
serving activities at the expense of shareholders. If high-centrality CEOs of IPO companies have similar 
incentives, then new shareholders may perceive such IPOs as risky and demand higher compensation in the 
form of greater underpricing for their willingness to invest. 
While IPO research traditionally associates greater underpricing with risky IPOs subject to large 
information asymmetry, some papers (e.g., Krigman, Shaw, and Womack, 2001) consider higher 
underpricing a sign of IPO success due to effective marketing effort of underwriters.3 Consequently, we 
analyze additional IPO factors in order to provide truly unambiguous tests regarding the benefits and costs 
of having a well-connected CEO at the time of an IPO. First, we study the determinants of the likelihood 
of offer price increase from the initial filing range. Second, and more importantly, we analyze the total net 
gain to pre-IPO owners due to the IPO process. We follow Cook, Kieschnick, and Van Ness (2006) and 
                                                          
2 El-Khatib et al. (2015) document that a change from 25th to 75th sample percentile bidder CEO centrality is associated 
with a 7.24 percentage point reduction in three-month returns following inside sell orders throughout CEO careers. 
The overall mean and median career post-selling returns are negative for high-centrality CEOs. 
3 On the other hand, IPO companies suffer monetary losses due to underpricing, and Dunbar (2000) shows that 
underwriters that underprice their IPOs tend to subsequently lose market share. 
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define the net IPO gain as the difference between IPO “wealth effect” (difference between the closing first 
trading day price and the midpoint of the IPO’s initial filing range for the portion of shares pre-IPO owners 
retain) and IPO “dilution effect” (the difference between the closing first trading day price and the offer 
price for the portion of IPO shares sold). If high-centrality CEOs generate primarily benefits for the pre-
IPO owners, then the likelihood of positive IPO net gain should be an increasing function of CEO centrality. 
Our worldwide network of executives and directors of public and private companies is constructed 
utilizing BoardEx database. BoardEx tracks interpersonal links created through past work relationships, 
joint educational overlaps, and memberships in social clubs, charities, etc. We compute individual degree 
and eigenvector centralities based on annual networks created from past employment in public and private 
companies worldwide. Such links are typically reliably verifiable, not subject to self-reporting bias, and 
most likely describe relationships where two linked individuals indeed met each other (unlike educational 
links based on attending the same educational institution, often with dozens of thousands of students).4 We 
assume that once established, links between two parties exist until one participant dies. As a result, our 
social networks grow in size over time. In the last sample year, 2013, our worldwide network contains 
nearly 41 million employment links formed by almost 560,000 firm executives and directors. 
Based on a sample of 906 IPOs between 2001 and 2013, we find that high-centrality CEOs are 
associated with higher underpricing. A firm whose CEO is in the 90th sample percentile of eigenvector 
centrality has the initial underpricing return higher by 9.29 percentage points compared to a firm whose 
CEO is in the 10th sample centrality percentile. This is a significant change compared to the median 8.16% 
first-day return for the firms in our sample. At the same time, IPO firms with high centrality CEOs have a 
significantly lower likelihood of offer price increase from the initial filing range. Ultimately, we document 
that companies with well-connected CEOs have the lowest chance to generate positive IPO net wealth 
effects – that is, the value-reducing dilution effect on shares sold dominates wealth gains on shares retained 
for pre-IPO owners in these firms. All of our findings are consistent with the overall negative impact of 
                                                          
4 In unreported robustness analysis, we create networks based on alternative definitions of links – such as educational 
and social overlaps. Our findings are similar to those presented in the main tables of this study. 
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CEO influence and power – as proxied by network centrality – in the context of IPO process. 
We further show the high underpricing persists, and the likelihood of positive net wealth effects is low 
for IPOs with high centrality CEOs whose networks are “inefficient” – that is, large in size (high degree 
centrality), but devoid of influential nodes (low eigenvector centrality). Such networks are least likely to 
mitigate information costs and aid information transfer to investors. 
Additionally, we document that one of the potential reasons for the problems associated with IPOs lead 
by high centrality CEOs is that the managerial labor market disciplining mechanisms are weak for those 
CEOs. While in general, low post-IPO long term performance is associated with higher likelihood of being 
replaced (a finding that is similar to Jenter and Kanaan, 2015), we find that the magnitude of post-IPO 
losses is unrelated to the turnover for high centrality CEOs. This finding suggests high network centrality 
allows CEOs to insulate themselves from monitoring of their activities and to achieve greater entrenchment. 
Last, we find that CEOs with high centrality generate significantly lower post-sale abnormal returns for 
both two-month and three-month periods following their sale of company’s stock. Consequently, IPO firms 
lead by high centrality CEOs may be perceived more risky because the CEOs with higher centrality tend to 
more often sell their shares before negative information gets revealed (thus benefitting themselves at the 
expense of the buyers), taking advantage of their insider information. 
Our results hold under various robustness checks. Most importantly, CEO centrality effects are 
unaffected even after we control for past relationships between the IPO firm managers and the underwriters 
(Cooney et al., 2015). Also, our results are very similar to those presented in this study if we substitute CEO 
centrality with the “excess centrality” equal to the difference between actual centrality and its predicted 
level based on firm and personal determinants of centrality. Additionally, our results hold after we control 
for effects of CEO’s age and years in the position.5 Last, our results are unaffected by inclusion of CEO 
overconfidence measures, and by utilizing an instrumental variable approach. Based on our robustness 
checks, our results are more likely due to the CEO network “social” capital (that is, information and 
                                                          
5 In unreported results, we find that being an older CEOs can reduce the impact of CEO centrality on IPO underpricing, 
but being a long tenured CEO does not have significant impact on IPO underpricing.  
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reputational effects that can be attained via social networks - e.g. Woolcock, 1998), and less likely due to 
CEOs “human” capital (that is, omitted variables related to skills and other personal attributes that may be 
correlated with CEO centrality). 
Our study makes several notable contributions. First, we add to the growing research on the importance 
of social networks in financial contracting. We are the first paper to study the role of individual– as opposed 
to firm – position within the whole social network of all business decision makers in the context of IPOs. 
A more central place puts the CEO higher in the social network hierarchy, and enables the CEO to be more 
influential and powerful. Our findings suggest that new IPO investors recognize that higher influence and 
power allows the CEOs to achieve greater entrenchment and to diminish the effectiveness of monitoring of 
CEO activities. Consequently, new investors demand higher compensation in the form of greater 
underpricing for their willingness to invest, which causes substantial dilution effects on IPO shares sold, 
and leaves pre-IPO investors with a lower likelihood of positive net wealth effects as the consequence of 
the IPO. In this regard, our study provides a contrasting view on the role of networking in the IPO process 
to papers that found prevailing beneficial effects for bilateral connections between IPO and underwriter 
managers (Cooney et al., 2015) and for the underwriter firm-specific centralities (Chuluun, 2015).6 
Second, we extend the literature on determinants of IPO underpricing and IPO overall wealth effects. 
We show that in addition to the known firm- and deal-specific determinants, the social network position of 
the CEO, related to influence and power, matter for IPO processes. 
Third, we contribute to research on the role of personal traits in finance (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 
2008; Billett and Qian, 2008; Cronquist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2012; Otto, 2014). However, unlike many 
previous studies where the personal traits of managers are taken from surveys or questionnaires (e.g. 
Kaplan, Klebanov, Sorensen, 2012; Graham, Harvey, Puri, 2013), CEO influence and power studied in our 
                                                          
6 We do not claim, however, that CEO centrality generates no benefits to investors. First, we find that underpricing is 
lower, and the likelihood of positive IPO net wealth effects for pre-IPO owners is higher in cases of IPOs with CEOs 
who have “efficient” networks (i.e., networks that are not characterized by the combination of high degree, but low 
eigenvector centrality). Second, high CEO network centrality may produce significant advantages for firm’s day-to-
day operations. The findings in this study suggest, though, that CEO network centrality may cause challenges within 
the actual IPO process – that is, the sale of IPO shares to new investors. 
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paper is based on quantifiable measures of network centrality, which utilizes objectively observable 
existence of social links. Importantly, the network centrality based on past work-related relationships is 
unlikely to be endogenous to the IPO outcomes we investigate. Network centrality is thus an ideal measure 
for studying the impact of managerial behavior on corporate outcomes, because it does not bring issues of 
potential reverse causality.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 presents the results and 
robustness check. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
2.1 CEO centrality  
We construct our centrality measures using data available from BoardEx. This database contains 
information about bilateral connections, education background and employment history, as well 
demographical and tenure information of the board members and senior executives of the firms all over the 
world. BoardEx forms different networks based on geographical regions and the way that people in the 
networks overlap. The entire network contains individual from all geographical regions with overlaps in 
employment, education, and social activities. It covers 574,645 individuals with 60 million links in its 
maximum network in 2013. In our paper, we use centrality measures generated from individuals’ overlap 
in employment worldwide because that is the most reliable connection type. Education and social activity 
connections are less reliable in that the sizes of the institutions (e.g., universities) where two overlapping 
people meet tend to be big and therefore the chances are slim that two overlapping people even actually 
interact during the years they both attend the institution. Our global network with employment overlapping 
results in a total of 559,490 individuals with 41 million bilateral connections. 
Centrality measures how powerful an individual is in a network. According to El-Khatib et al. (2015), 
a powerful individual in a network might be efficient in reaching others and transferring information, which 
leads to an improved position for bargaining and negotiation. Two common measures of centrality are 
constructed in this paper: degree and eigenvector. Degree centrality measures how many nodes an 
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individual is directly connected to. The more direct connections an individual has, the higher his/her degree 
centrality is. Eigenvector centrality measures how important an individual is within a network. An 
individual gets a higher eigenvector centrality measure if he/she has more connections with high degree 
centrality measures.  
We identify the CEO for the IPO firm in the IPO year through the BoardEx database.7 If a firm has two 
or more co-CEOs in the IPO year, we pick the CEO with the highest centrality measure because we believe 
that the CEO with the highest centrality measure should have more influence. To make our centrality 
measures comparable across the years, we construct percentile values for both degree centrality and 
eigenvector centrality by year, and the value ranges from 0, the lowest centrality, to 99, the highest centrality. 
The percentile value reflects the ranking position of an individual in the entire network that we use, not just 
the ranking within the sample CEOs. This transformation enables rank-order comparison of centrality 
values across different years, even as the annual networks monotonously increase in size. In addition, the 
percentile transformation allows easier discussion of centrality-related results, especially because the 
eigenvector centrality values lack clear economic interpretation. In all tables and regression models 
described below, CEO centrality is utilized in terms of percentages. However, significances of CEO 
centrality coefficients are similar if we use raw centrality scores instead. We use the centrality measures of 
the CEOs in the year prior to the firm’s IPO year to eliminate the timing concerns about the centrality 
measures and IPO. In the regression analysis, we use natural logarithm of percentile ranking as the centrality 
measure because there should be a diminishing marginal effect on the increases in percentile ranking. For 
example, a CEO increasing her centrality ranking from 50th percentile to 60th percentile should have a 
greater impact on the firm than another CEO who increases her centrality ranking from 80th percentile to 
90th percentile.  
Table 1 summarizes the personal characteristics of CEOs in our sample. The mean age of CEOs in our 
sample is 52, and they have been on the board for an average of 3 years. Average (median) number of CEO 
                                                          
7 We also use BoardEx to obtain CEO characteristics including their employment history, age, tenure in position, and 
tenure in company. 
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connections in our sample is 174 (69). The CEOs have a mean (median) degree centrality percentile of 64 
(67) and a mean eigenvector centrality percentile of 65 (67), suggesting that CEOs of IPO firms are better 
connected compared to “typical” board members of executives of firms around the world.8 
Table 1 - Summary Statistics of Sample CEOs 
This table presents the summary statistics of individual characteristics of the CEOs in sample firms. Mean, 
median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation are calculated for each individual characteristics 
variable. Age is the CEO's age in the firm IPO year. Years to retirement is the years to CEO's expected 
retirement, which is equal to 65. Years in role is the years that the CEO has held the current position. Years 
on board is the years that the CEO has been on the board. Years in company is the years that the CEO has 
been working at the current company. Degree centrality is the number of links a CEO has in the year prior 
to IPO. Degree centrality percentile is the percentile ranking of the CEO in terms of the degree centrality 
across all individuals in the BoardEx database in the year prior to IPO. Eigenvector centrality percentile is 
the percentile ranking of the CEO in terms of the eigenvector centrality across all individuals in the BoardEx 
database in the year prior to the IPO. 
 
In addition to CEO centrality percentiles, we introduce another centrality measure: inefficient 
networking. It is assessed based on the relation between CEO’s eigenvector centrality percentile and degree 
centrality percentile. Since eigenvector centrality measures the importance of the connections whereas 
degree centrality only measures the number of connection, CEOs with efficient networking should rank 
higher in terms of eigenvector centrality than in degree centrality. We compute the difference between 
CEOs eigenvector centrality percentile and degree centrality percentile, and create the inefficient network 
dummy, which takes 1 if the difference is below 33rd percentile within the sample CEOs (that is, the 
inefficiently networked executives rank high in terms of numbers of total links, but relatively low in terms 
                                                          
8 On the other hand, there is still a considerable centrality dispersion in our sample. It contains CEOs with degree or 
eigenvector centralities from the 1st percentile (that is, the second lowest) to the 99th percentile (that is, the highest). 
The total numbers of CEO (degree) connections range from 1 to 1,815. 
Variables Mean Median P10 P90 
Standard 
Deviation 
Age 51.50 51.00 42.00 62.00 7.98 
Years in Role 2.21 0.70 0.00 6.50 3.63 
Years on Board 2.95 0.80 0.00 7.90 4.75 
Years in Company 3.51 0.80 0.00 9.30 5.44 
Degree Centrality Score 173.57 68.50 15.00 464.00 249.46 
Degree Centrality Percentile 63.62 67.00 27.00 93.00 24.72 
Eigenvector Centrality Percentile 64.67 67.00 35.00 92.00 22.06 
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of relevance of their connections).  
 
2.2 IPO and firm financial data 
We collect data on IPOs from 2001 to 2013 utilizing Thomson Financial’s SDC new issues database. 
We only include IPOs domiciled in U.S. and exclude all close-end funds and unit offerings. The IPOs are 
excluded if company financial data of is not available in CRSP. We then manually match the IPO firms in 
SDC database with BoardEx database, and keep those observations that are available in both databases. We 
further require CEO information to be available on BoardEx in the IPO year. Ultimately, our sample 
contains 906 IPO firm (and, correspondingly, 906 CEOs). We obtain IPO proceeds, number of shares 
offered to number of shares outstanding, price revision, underwriter compensation (measured by gross 
spread), selling concession, whether an IPO is venture backed, Nasdaq return two weeks prior to IPO, and 
whether the IPO is listed on NYSE from SDC database. We obtain underwriter ranking and firm age data 
from Jay Ritter’s website. We discover whether CEO has bilateral connections with the underwriter prior 
to the IPO using BoardEx database. Table 2 Panel A shows the distribution of sample IPOs by year. The 
numbers of our IPOs gradually increase until the time of 2008-2009 financial crisis. Following the 
substantial drop in IPO filings due to the financial crisis, the annual numbers of sample observations 
continue to increase until the last sample year, 2013.  
We obtain firm financial data from CRSP database. Additionally, we obtain insider trading data and 
the data for computing CEO overconfidence from Thomson Reuters database. Firm financial data are based 
on the fiscal year-end prior to the IPO year. Table 2 (Panel B) reports the summary statistics of the sample 
firm’s financial variables and IPO variables. 
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Table 2 Distribution of Sample IPOs by Year and Summary Statistics of Sample CEOs 
Panel A presents the sample distribution of the 906 IPO firms in our sample by IPO year. The number of 
observations, the percentage of the observations and the accumulative percentage of the observations are 
calculated by year. Panel B presents summary statistics of a sample of 906 IPO firms from 2001 to 2013. 
The mean, median, 10th percentile, 90th percentile, standard deviation and number of observations are 
calculated for each financial variable. Total assets is the total assets of the IPO firm at the end of the fiscal 
year before IPO. Total revenue is the total revenue of the IPO firm at the end of the fiscal year before IPO. 
Net income is the net income of the IPO firm at the end of the fiscal year prior to IPO. ROA is the return 
on assets the fiscal year prior to IPO. Debt ratio is the total debt to total assets at the end of the fiscal year 
prior to IPO. IPO proceed is the amount the company raise in the IPO. First-day return is the percentage 
change of the closing price on the IPO day from the offer price. Positive price revision is a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if the offer price is greater than the middle filing price. Positive insider wealth gain is a dummy 
variable that takes 1 if insider gain is greater than IPO dilution effect and 0 otherwise. 
 
Panel A    
Year N Percent Cum. 
2001 18 1.99 1.99 
2002 16 1.77 3.75 
2003 38 4.19 7.95 
2004 121 13.36 21.30 
2005 89 9.82 31.13 
2006 123 13.58 44.70 
2007 103 11.37 56.07 
2008 12 1.32 57.40 
2009 22 2.43 59.82 
2010 74 8.17 67.99 
2011 67 7.40 75.39 
2012 82 9.05 84.44 
2013 141 15.56 100.00 
Total 906 100   
Panel B       
Variables Unit Mean Median p10 p90 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Assets $ million 1886.60 144.76 21.22 2388.38 12307.00 
Total Revenue $ million 901.82 94.96 1.89 1502.10 5376.69 
Net Income $ million 255.98 0.45 -34.70 54.46 5088.56 
ROA   -26.66% 0.19% -74.24% 15.73% 124.42% 
Debt Ratio (Debt/Total Assets)   0.32 0.18 0.00 0.73 0.52 
IPO Proceed  ($ million) $ million 310.70 121.90 42.00 529.70 1184.39 
First-day return percentage 13.62% 8.16% -4.21% 39.06% 21.85% 
Positive Price Revision   0.61 1 0 1 0.49 
Positive Insider Wealth Gain   0.62 1 0 1 0.48 
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We measure IPO performance in three ways: first-day return, price revision, and insider wealth gain. 
The first-day return (that is, IPO underpricing) is measured as the percentage gain at the close price on the 
first trading day of the IPO as comparing with the offer price. Price revision is measured as the difference 
between the offer price and the middle filing price for the IPO. Insider wealth gain captures whether the 
insiders are better-off from the IPO by comparing the appreciation of their holding shares during the IPO 
and value loss from the selling of their holdings during the IPO. Table 2 (Panel B) shows that the mean 
(median) IPO underpricing is 13.62% (8.16%). The sample proportions of IPO firms experiencing positive 
price revision (positive insider wealth gain) are 61% and 62%, respectively.Before performing 
comprehensive multi-variate analysis of CEO network centrality on IPO performance, we present a 
univariate analysis of first-day returns. We divide the sample into terciles based on CEO’s centrality 
percentile rankings: top 33% (highest sample centrality percentiles), middle 33%, and bottom 33% (lowest 
sample centrality percentiles); and compare the initial return between the three subsamples. The results are 
presented in Table 3. Average first-day IPO return for the most connected CEOs based on degree 
(eigenvector) centrality is 17.34% (17.33%), which is statistically significantly higher than the average 
first-day return for the subsample of IPOs with the least connected CEOs, 11.06% (11.88%). Similarly, 
median first-day IPO returns for the sample of most connected CEOs based on degree (eigenvector) 
centrality, 10.00% (10.76%) are again significantly higher than the medians for the low centrality CEOs, 
6.84% (6.75%). These findings suggest that IPOs managed by well-connected CEOs may be risky and/or 
highly demanded by investors. Next section will thus provide a more comprehensive multivariate analysis 
of the effects of CEO centrality on IPO outcomes. 
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Table 3 Statistics of First-day return by Subsamples 
This table presents the mean, median, minimum and maximum of first-day return for the full sample and 3 
subsamples split by three different centrality measures of the CEOs. Degree centrality (percentile) is the 
percentile ranking of the CEO by degree centrality score across all individuals in BoardEx database. 
Eigenvector centrality (percentile) is the percentile ranking of the CEO by eigenvector centrality score 
across all individuals in BoardEx database. *** and ** denote the statistical significance of the difference 
in mean and median between top 33% and bottom 33% of the firms by centrality measures of their CEOs 
at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 Mean Median N 
Full Sample 
 
13.62% 8.16% 903 
Subsamples by Degree Centrality (Percentile) 
Bottom 33% 11.06% 6.84% 306 
Middle 33% 12.51% 6.58% 297 
Top 33% 17.34% 10.00% 300 
Top - Bottom 6.28%*** 3.16** 
 
Subsamples by Eigenvector Centrality (Percentile) 
Bottom 33% 11.88% 6.75% 304 
Middle 33% 11.67% 6.88% 299 
Top 33% 17.33% 10.76% 300 
Top - Bottom 5.45%*** 4.01%***  
 
3. CEO Network Centrality and IPO Performance 
3.1 Initial IPO Return 
One of the most important measures of IPO performance is the return of the stock on the first day of 
public trading. IPO is risky because of information asymmetries. We expect CEO centrality to be associated 
with initial IPO returns for several reasons. First, CEOs with high centrality may use their position in the 
network to efficiently gather and transfer private information so that it creates value for the company in the 
IPO process. Second, network effect incentivizes CEOs to care more about their reputations. According to 
Fogel et al. (2015), the existence of network makes it easier for others in the network to penalize the CEO 
who conducts harmful behaviors to their firms and investors. Many scholars find that this phenomenon is 
more profound for individuals standing at “the center of the stage” like CEO (see Boot et al. 1993; Burt, 
2005; Brass and Labianca, 2006). Moreover, Graham et al. (2005) find that the first career concern for 
executives is to maintain their reputations. Ultimately, both of the above reasons – easier access to and 
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transfer of private information, as well as reputational effects – suggest that firms run by well-connected 
CEOs are associated with lower information asymmetry, and lower risk for the investors. Consequently, 
IPOs run by high centrality CEOs may be associated with low initial return on the first trading day, because 
underwriter may upward revise the subscription price in conjunction with high demand on the firm’s stocks, 
and IPO investors may not require high underpricing to compensate them for the risk of investment. 
On the other hand, CEO centrality can have information asymmetry- and risk-enhancing impact on the 
IPO firm. EI-Khatib et al. (2015) show that well-connected CEOs can take advantage of their power on the 
board to influence the decisions of the board and reap private benefits at the expense of shareholders. El-
Khatib et al. (2015) also show that CEOs with high centrality are able to avoid market discipline and 
monitoring. In addition, Liu (2010) argues that CEOs are more likely to find a new position no matter for 
what reasons they were laid off. Consequently, high CEO centrality may be associated with a high IPO 
initial return.9 
Table 4 reports the OLS regression estimates of IPO first-day return on CEO centrality, controlling for 
IPO and firm characteristics. The dependent variable is the stock return of the firm on the IPO day measured 
by percentage change from the offer price to the first closing price. The control variable selection follows 
Cook et al. (2006). Importantly, since Cooney et al. (2015) find that the bilateral connection between CEO 
and underwriter affects IPO outcome, both for shareholders of the IPO company (in terms of abnormal 
returns earned) and the underwriters (in terms of their compensation), we control for past relationships 
between the IPO firm managers and underwriters in this and all subsequent tables by including a dummy 
variable tracking the presence of such bilateral connections. Model (1) uses degree centrality as CEO 
centrality measure, model (2) and (3) use eigenvector centrality as CEO centrality measures, and model (3) 
also adds the inefficient networking dummy. The results in all models show that CEO centrality – both 
                                                          
9 In this section, our arguments are based on the prevalent view that (high) initial IPO return is primarily linked to 
(high) information asymmetry and (high) risk. On the other hand, some researchers (e.g. Krigman et al., 2001) consider 
high underpricing the consequence of excess demand for shares, possibly due to successful marketing of the IPO by 
underwriters. We address this potential explanation of underpricing in the next section, and find results largely 
inconsistent with the excess demand driving underpricing in our sample. 
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degree and eigenvector – is a positively significant determinant of IPO first-day returns. Firms with more 
central CEOs have significantly higher IPO first-day returns than firms with less central CEOs. The 
economic significance of CEO centrality measures is high. We find that all else equal, if CEO degree 
centrality moves from 10th to 95th percentile ranking within our sample, IPO initial return would increase 
by 5.18 percentage points. If CEO eigenvector centrality moves from 10th to 90th percentile ranking within 
our sample, IPO initial return would increase by 9.29 percentage points. These are substantial changes given 
the median 8.16% first-day return for the firms in our sample. The results in model (3) shows that inefficient 
networking is positively correlated with high IPO initial returns. The results are supportive to our hypothesis 
that CEO centrality increases the riskiness of IPO and thus results in a higher IPO initial return. Moreover, 
the results show that inefficient networking further increases the risk of IPO evidenced by increasing 8.83 
percentage points, on average, to the initial return of IPO. In all models, we control the firm size effect, IPO 
characteristics, firm characteristics and the effect of IPO price revision. CEO centrality measures are still 
positively significant with all the controls. 10 
The results shown in table 4 suggest high CEO centrality may be associated with riskier IPOs, causing 
the investors to demand higher compensation for their willingness to invest in the form of higher 
underpricing. However, it is still possible that high underpricing can be a (positive) consequence of 
increased demand for shares of IPOs managed by high centrality CEOs. Thus, in the next section, we 
attempt to disentangle these two effects – high risk vs high demand – by studying the relation between CEO 
centrality, IPO price revisions, and overall IPO wealth effects generated for firm initial investors. 
  
                                                          
10  In unreported analysis, we also regress the underwriter compensation, measured by gross spread and selling 
concessions, on CEO centrality measures controlling for CEO-underwriter relationships. We find that the CEO 
centrality measure does not significantly impact underwriter compensation. 
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Table 4 Regression Estimates of IPO Underpricing and CEO Centrality 
This table presents the results of OLS regression estimates of first-day return of IPO firms on centrality 
measures of CEOs, inefficient networking measure and other control variables. The dependent variable is 
the stock return of the firm on the IPO day measured by percentage change from the offer price to the first 
closing price. CEO centrality of the IPO firm is degree percentile in column (1), eigenvector percentile in 
columns (2) and (3). Inefficient networking is a dummy variable. It takes 1 if the value of a CEO's 
eigenvector centrality percentile minus degree centrality percentile is ranked in bottom 33% of the sample 
and 0 otherwise. Firm size is measured by natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the 
IPO. Float ratio is number of shares offered to number of shares outstanding after IPO. Ln(IPO Proceeds) 
is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of the IPO firm. Underwriter ranking is a dummy variable that 
takes 1 if the underwriter of the IPO has reputation rank being 8 or higher ranked by Loughran and Ritter 
(2004) and the data is obtained from Jay Ritter’s website: http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm. 
NYSE is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the IPO is listed on NYSE. Venture backed IPO is a dummy 
variable that takes 1 if the IPO is venture backed and 0 otherwise. Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO is 
the NASDAQ return over the 2 weeks prior to the IPO. Firm age is the years from the firm's founding date, 
which is obtained from http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm, and IPO filing date, which 
is obtained from SDC. CEO connected with banker is a dummy that takes 1 if CEO has connection with 
board of the underwriter. Price revision is the change from middle filling price to the offer price. Price 
revision residual is the residual from the price revision regression. All independent variables and control 
variables are lagged by one year. All models include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return Degree Eigenvector Inefficient Networking 
        
Degree 0.0236**   
 (0.0117)   
Eigenvector  0.0423** 0.0576** 
  (0.0174) (0.0224) 
Inefficient networking   0.0883** 
   (0.0382) 
Firm Size -0.00668 -0.00635 -0.00707 
 (0.00747) (0.00740) (0.00759) 
Float ratio -127,883*** -129,829*** -130,904*** 
 (32,540) (32,708) (32,913) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) -0.141*** -0.143*** -0.156*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0532) (0.0577) 
Underwriter ranking 0.0207 0.0208 0.0208 
 (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
NYSE 0.0525** 0.0513** 0.0593** 
 (0.0256) (0.0254) (0.0277) 
Ventured backed IPO -0.110 -0.114 -0.127* 
 (0.0698) (0.0715) (0.0759) 
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Table 4 Regression Estimates of IPO Underpricing and CEO Centrality (Cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return Degree Eigenvector Inefficient Networking 
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO -0.00264 -0.00251 -0.00305 
 (0.00339) (0.00335) (0.00353) 
Firm age 0.000836* 0.000839* 0.000832* 
 (0.000503) (0.000504) (0.000496) 
CEO connected with banker 0.0159 0.0149 0.00904 
 (0.0374) (0.0372) (0.0372) 
Price revision 4.258*** 4.246*** 4.468*** 
 (1.309) (1.308) (1.385) 
Price revision residual -3.664*** -3.651*** -3.877*** 
 (1.310) (1.309) (1.386) 
Constant 0.873*** 0.808*** 0.777*** 
 (0.294) (0.267) (0.252) 
Year effects Y Y Y 
    
Observations 890 889 889 
R-squared 0.274 0.274 0.274 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
3.2 Positive price revision 
In this section, we investigate the relationship between CEO centrality and positive price revisions of 
the subscription price from the initial filing price initiated by the underwriters. A positive price revision 
benefits not only the IPO firm by raising more capital but also increases the wealth of pre-IPO shareholders 
(Cooney et al., 2015).  If CEO centrality has a positive impact on the firm and thus leads to a greater demand 
for IPO shares, we expect to see a greater likelihood of positive price revisions in firms ran by CEOs with 
high centrality.  
Table 5 shows the Probit regression estimation of the likelihood of a positive price revision on CEO 
centrality controlling for firm size effects, IPO characteristics, and firm characteristics. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the IPO has a positive price revision from midpoint of a filing 
price range and 0 otherwise. Model (1) uses CEO degree centrality, and models (2) and (3) utilize CEO 
eigenvector centrality. We include other control variables that are important in predicting price revision 
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according to Cook et al. (2006), and also control for the existence of bilateral connections between the IPO 
firm and the underwriter (Cooney et al. 2015). Our results show that high CEO centrality is associated with 
lower likelihood of positive IPO price revisions (degree centrality insignificantly, but eigenvector centrality 
significantly at 5% level). This result is economically significant. All else equal, an IPO firm with a within-
sample 90th percentile centrality ranked CEO is 15.3% less likely to receive an upward price revision than 
an IPO firm with a within-sample 10th percentile centrality ranked CEO (a rather substantial increase given 
the 61% sample unconditional frequency of positive price adjustments). 
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Table 5 Regression Estimates of IPO Positive Price Revision and CEO Centrality 
This table presents the probit regression estimates of positive price revision of IPO firms on centrality 
measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 if 
there is a positive price revision from middle filling price to offer price and 0 otherwise. CEO centrality of 
the IPO firm is degree percentile in column (1), and eigenvector percentile in columns (2) and (3). 
Inefficient networking is a dummy variable. It takes 1 if the value of a CEO's eigenvector centrality 
percentile minus degree centrality percentile is ranked in bottom 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. Firm 
size is measured by natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Ln(IPO Proceeds) 
is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of the IPO firm. NYSE is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the 
IPO is listed on NYSE. Venture backed IPO is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the IPO is venture backed 
and 0 otherwise. Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO is the NASDAQ return over the 2 weeks prior to the 
IPO. Firm age is the years from the firm's founding date, which is obtained from 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm, and IPO filing date, which is obtained from SDC. 
CEO connected with banker is a dummy that takes 1 if CEO has connection with board of the underwriter. 
All independent variables and control variables are lagged by one year. All models include year effects. 
Robust standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive offer price revision) Degree Eigenvector 
Inefficient 
Networking 
       
Degree -0.0790   
 (0.0875)   
Eigenvector  -0.193** -0.215** 
  (0.0943) (0.0975) 
Inefficient networking   -0.147 
   (0.0944) 
Firm Size 0.00336 0.00310 0.00257 
 (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0304) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) 0.426*** 0.434*** 0.441*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0661) (0.0665) 
NYSE -0.232** -0.228** -0.238** 
 (0.114) (0.115) (0.114) 
Ventured backed IPO 0.321*** 0.341*** 0.345*** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO 0.0217 0.0212 0.0214 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0144) 
Firm age -0.00261 -0.00259 -0.00242 
 (0.00201) (0.00200) (0.00201) 
CEO connected with banker 0.0164 0.0365 0.0483 
 (0.194) (0.193) (0.194) 
Constant -1.613*** -1.193** -1.060* 
 (0.532) (0.541) (0.557) 
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Table 5 Regression Estimates of IPO Positive Price Revision and CEO Centrality (Cont.) 
Year effects Y Y Y 
    
Observations 906 905 905 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
The results do not support the hypothesis that high CEO centrality has a risk-reducing impact on the 
IPO firm. Rather, firms with high centrality CEO are perceived as riskier and thus its IPO need to be 
underpriced more to compensate the risk that investors are bearing. Therefore, the underwriter is thus less 
likely to revise the subscription price upward. 
3.3 Insider wealth gain 
According to Loughran and Ritter (2002), Bradley and Jordan (2002) and Cooney et al. (2015), initial 
return and price revision do not show a comprehensive picture of IPO performance. Pre-IPO shareholders’ 
main goal is to obtain wealth gain through the IPO. Hence, a successful IPO should gain wealth for the 
insiders. We examine whether high centrality CEO is associated with positive wealth gain for the pre-IPO 
shareholders. If CEO’s high centrality has a positive effect on IPO firm, it should be associated with higher 
likelihood of pre-IPO shareholder gaining wealth and vice versa. Pre-IPO shareholders’ wealth increases 
when IPO firm has a positive price revision from initial filling price and positive return on the first day of 
trading for the shares that they retain from pre-IPO to post-IPO. Pre-IPO shareholders lose wealth when 
they sell the shares at the offer price and the price per share increases thereafter, which cause them “leave 
the money on the table”. We compute pre-IPO shareholders’ wealth gain from retained shares net of wealth 
loss from sold shares in IPO. That is, the wealth gain is defined as: 
Wealth effect = (1st day closing price – midpoint of filling price range) × shares retained – 
(1st day closing price – offer price) × shares sold 
 
We investigate if high centrality CEO is associated with high likelihood of positive wealth gain by pre-
IPO shareholders. (Cooney et al. (2015) perform a similar analysis in their investigation of bilateral links 
between IPO firms and underwriters.) 
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Table 6 shows the results of probit regression of probability of positive wealth gain by pre-IPO 
shareholders on CEO centrality, IPO characteristics, firm characteristics and connection between CEO and 
underwriter’s board members. Model (1) uses degree centrality as CEO centrality measure, model (2) and 
(3) use eigenvector centrality as CEO centrality measures, and model (3) adds inefficient networking 
dummy. The selection of control variables follows Cook et al. (2006). The results show CEO centrality is 
negatively associated with the likelihood of positive wealth gain by the pre-IPO shareholders (degree 
centrality not significantly, but eigenvector centrality significantly at 5% level). This suggests that high 
CEO centrality does not benefit pre-IPO shareholders during the IPO process, and is consistent with our 
findings in previous tables showing that IPO firms managed by well-connected CEOs have greater IPO 
underpricing and lower likelihood of positive subscription price revisions. Model (3) further indicates that 
inefficient networking also significantly reduces the likelihood of positive wealth gain by the pre-IPO 
shareholders. 
Our findings are economically significant. All else equal, a firm with a CEO at the 90th percentile 
centrality ranking in our sample would have 18.0 percentage points less likely to have a positive wealth 
gain by pre-IPO shareholders than a firm with a CEO at the 10th percentile centrality ranking (a substantial 
change given the unconditional sample frequency of IPOs with a positive wealth effect is equal to 62.4%). 
Overall, our findings in Tables 3-6 provide evidence on significant links between CEO centrality and 
firm’s IPO performance. High centrality CEOs are associated with high IPO underpricing for the firm. The 
high underpricing of those IPOs does not indicate the success of the IPO marketing. Instead, it reflects the 
higher risk the market perceives, implying a larger discount in the offer price. The higher risk of IPOs 
managed by high centrality CEOs is further evidenced by a lower likelihood of positive IPO price revisions 
and lower likelihood of pre-IPO shareholders’ wealth gains. Additionally, we find evidence that high 
underpricing, low likelihood of positive price revisions, and lower likelihood of pre-IPO shareholders’ 
wealth gains are all further exacerbated if CEOs are inefficiently networked – that is, if they have many 
connections with little overall importance for the network.   
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Table 6 Regression Estimates of Positive Insider Wealth Effects and CEO Centrality 
This table presents the probit regression estimates of insider wealth gain of IPO firms on centrality measures 
of CEOs, efficient networking measures of CEOs and other control variables. The dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes 1 if there is an insider wealth gain and 0 otherwise. Follow Cook et al. (2006), we define 
insider wealth gain as the wealth effects of IPO minus dilution effects of IPO. CEO centrality of the IPO 
firm is degree percentile in column (1), eigenvector percentile in columns (2) and (3). Inefficient networking 
is a dummy variable. It takes 1 if the value of a CEO's eigenvector centrality percentile minus degree 
centrality percentile is ranked in bottom 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. Firm size is measured by 
natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. Float ratio is number of shares offered 
to number of shares outstanding after IPO. Ln(IPO Proceeds) is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of 
the IPO firm. CEO connected with banker is a dummy that takes 1 if CEO has connection with board of the 
underwriter. Firm age is the years from the firm's founding date, which is obtained from 
http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/FoundingDates.htm, and IPO filing date, which is obtained from SDC. 
Residual of initial return is the residual from the initial return regression. All independent variables and 
control variables are lagged by one year. All models include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain) Degree Eigenvector 
Inefficient 
Networking 
         
Degree (Percentile) -0.0494   
 
 (0.0898)   
 
Eigenvector  -0.216** -0.246*** 
 
  (0.0891) (0.0912) 
 
Inefficient networking   -0.175* 
 
   (0.0996) 
 
Firm Size 0.0315 0.0280 0.0258 
 
 (0.0293) (0.0295) (0.0294) 
 
Float ratio -1.066e+06*** -1.161e+06*** -1.186e+06*** 
 
 (262,866) (261,927) (265,390) 
 
Ln(IPO proceeds) 0.380*** 0.395*** 0.402*** 
 
 (0.0620) (0.0633) (0.0635) 
 
CEO connected with banker 0.0459 0.0813 0.0986 
 
 (0.205) (0.205) (0.206) 
 
Firm age -0.00622*** -0.00616*** -0.00605*** 
 
 (0.00212) (0.00212) (0.00213) 
 
Residual of initial return 3.106*** 3.123*** 3.144*** 
 
 (0.323) (0.324) (0.326) 
 
Constant -0.866 -0.206 -0.0309 
 
 (0.562) (0.553) (0.568) 
 
Year effects Y Y Y  
     
Observations 890 889 889  
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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3.4 Post-IPO CEO Turnover 
The managerial labor market offers a mechanism that disciplines the senior managers in order to work 
in the interest of the shareholders. Well-governed firms optimally fire managers associated with poor firm 
performance (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan, 2015). However, if well-connected CEOs are able to utilize their 
influence and power to gain more secure entrenchment, then managerial labor market fails its important 
governance role, and the IPOs lead by such CEOs may be perceived inherently more risky, which may 
indeed lead to higher underpricing and lower likelihood of positive price adjustments, as well as positive 
wealth effects described in Tables 4-6.  
Following Jenter and Kanaan (2015) and El-Khatib et al. (2015), we use Cox Hazard model to test how 
post-IPO stock performance (measured by the one-year abnormal stock return after the IPO) impact the 
odds of the CEO leaving the firm after the IPO.  We obtain CEO turnover data by examining their 
employment history in the BoardEx database. Of the final sample of 597 CEOs based on data availability, 
198 were replaced during the first three years post-IPO.11 We utilize the following specification of Cox 
Hazard model: 
(CEO Turnover = 1|𝑋𝑖)
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽3𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 × 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 × (1 − 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑖
+ 𝛽7𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖 
where the dependent variable is the hazard rate of CEO turnover in the sample period. The one-year 
abnormal return is the stock return of the IPO firm from the first closing day to the 12th month after the IPO 
month in excess of a value-weighted market portfolio return. High centrality is a dummy variable that takes 
1 if the CEO’s centrality measure falls in the top 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. CEO age is the age 
                                                          
11 Due to a relatively small IPO sample size, we retain all CEO replacements, not just “disciplinary”, defined by 
Parrino (1997) to be replacement that are not due to CEO retirement or reassignment within a company (e.g. CEO 
move to the Chairman of Board). However, our results are qualitatively similar, albeit less significant, if utilize just 
disciplinary turnovers in our analysis. 
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of CEO at the time of IPO. Firm size is the total revenue of the IPO company in the fiscal year prior to the 
IPO. Tobin’s q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal 
year of IPO multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of 
preferred stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets. Fi is a vector of firm specific financial 
characteristics. Industry fixed effect is a series of dummy variables indicating the industry of the IPO firm. 
Crisis year dummy takes value 1 if the firm’s IPO is in year 2008 or 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
The results are presented in Table 7. Consistent with previous literature (e.g. Jenter and Kanaan, 2015), 
Model 1 shows that the likelihood of CEO turnover is negatively correlated with post-IPO performance, 
suggesting that CEOs with poorer firm long-term performance are more likely to be replaced. However, 
Models 2 and 3 suggest that only low centrality CEOs tend to be replaced in case of poor stock returns, as 
evidenced by significantly negative coefficients for Abnormal Return*[1- High Centrality dummy]. The 
coefficient measuring the turnover-performance sensitivity for the subsample of high centrality CEOs 
(measured by Abnormal Return*[High Centrality dummy] coefficient) is insignificant. Models 2 and 3 
further show that centrality per se is an insignificant determinant of CEO turnover. Ultimately, our findings 
suggest that well-connected CEOs are able to utilize their influence and power to solidify their 
entrenchment in the post-IPO firm. 12 
3.5 CEO Centrality and Insider Trading 
Finance literature documents that sales of firm’s shares initiated by company’s insiders are associated 
with a negative signal about the future firm value (Seyhun 1992; Clarke et al. 2001). We test if CEOs with 
high centrality are more likely to take advantage of insider information and execute sales that are followed 
by low abnormal stock returns. If so, investing in firms run by CEOs with high centrality should be 
perceived as risky, and the company such CEOs lead should have high underpricing, low probability of 
positive price revision and low probability of wealth gain to the existing shareholders during the IPO. 
  
                                                          
12  In unreported analysis, we get similar results if we replace post-IPO abnormal stock returns with post-IPO 
accounting returns as the measure to determine performance-turnover sensitivity. 
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Table 7 Cox Hazard Regression Estimates of CEO Turnover 
This table presents the estimation results of the Cox Hazard regression model to predict the CEO turnover 
after an IPO between 2001 and 2014. The dependent variable is the hazard rate of CEO turnover in the 
sample period. The CEO turnover is measured in the 3 years post-IPO. The 1-year abnormal return is the 
stock return of the IPO firm from the first closing day to the 12th month after the IPO month in excess of a 
value-weighted market portfolio return, respectively. High centrality is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the 
CEO’s centrality measure falls in the top 33% of the sample and 0 otherwise. CEO age is the age of CEO 
at the time of IPO. Firm size is the total revenue of the IPO company in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Tobin’q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year 
of IPO multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred 
stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets. Industry fixed effect is a series of dummy variables 
indicating the industry of the IPO firm. Crisis year effect takes value 1 if the firm’s IPO is in year 2008 or 
2009 and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dep.variable = Prob(CEO turnover) Eigenvector Degree 
 
   
1-year Abnormal Return 
-6.668***    
(1.824)   
Degree 
  0.199  
  (0.153) 
Eigenvector 
 -0.0431   
 (0.160)  
1-year Abnormal Return * (1 - High Centrality) 
 -6.933*** -7.659***  
 (2.079) (2.193) 
1-year Abnormal Return * High Centrality 
 -5.560 -4.848
 
 
 (3.667) (3.387) 
CEO Age 
0.00465 0.00443 0.00482  
(0.00872) (0.00876) (0.00885) 
Firm Size 
-0.000138* -0.000137* -0.000151*  
(7.92e-05) (7.89e-05) (8.15e-05) 
Tobin's Q 
-0.00284 -0.00368 -0.00395  
(0.0354) (0.0353) (0.0358) 
Industry Fixed Effect 
Yes Yes Yes 
Crisis Year Effect 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
597 596 597 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We analyze the stock performance following the sales executed by the CEOs in our sample within 1 
year after the IPO. We use three- and two-month abnormal return to measure the stock performance. In 
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Table 8, we find that CEOs with high centrality are associated with lower three-month and two-month 
abnormal returns following a sale. The results hold after controlling for the size effect of the firm and the 
IPO, as well as the industry fixed effect using 4-digit SIC code of the company. Therefore, our findings 
provide supporting evidence as for why firms led by CEOs with high centrality are perceived as riskier. 
 
Table 8 Post-Insider Sale Performance and CEO Centrality 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of post-insider sale abnormal returns on the centrality 
measures, size of firm and IPO, and industry effect dummies as control variables. The dependent variable 
for columns (1) and (3) is three-month abnormal return of the security following an insider sale. The 
dependent variable for columns (2) and (4) is two-month abnormal return of the security following an 
insider sale. Firm size is measured by natural logarithm of total revenue in the fiscal year prior to the IPO. 
Ln(IPO Proceeds) is the natural logarithms of IPO proceeds of the IPO firm. Industry fixed effect is a series 
of dummy variables indicating the industry of the IPO firm using 4-digit SIC code. Robust standard errors 
are included in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance from zero at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Three-month 
Abnormal Return 
Two-month 
Abnormal Return 
Three-month 
Abnormal Return 
Two-month 
Abnormal Return 
          
Degree -0.0705** -0.0646***   
 (0.0289) (0.0223)   
Eigenvector   -0.0594* -0.0557** 
   (0.0351) (0.0264) 
Firm Size 8.14e-05 6.95e-05 7.09e-05 6.03e-05 
 (4.96e-05) (4.22e-05) (4.97e-05) (4.31e-05) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) -0.000510 -0.00481 -0.00123 -0.00547 
 (0.00606) (0.00428) (0.00595) (0.00421) 
Constant 0.201 0.220** 0.161 0.188* 
 (0.125) (0.0918) (0.146) (0.105) 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,173 1,173 1,173 1,173 
R-squared 0.251 0.222 0.248 0.218 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6 Endogeneity and Centrality Determinants 
3.6.1 Instrumental variable analysis 
In our paper, we suggest a causal relation between CEO centrality and IPO outcomes. While it is not 
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likely that the execution of IPO affects CEO centrality directly, we still want to consider the possibility that, 
for example, greater underpricing benefitting new shareholders may give CEO opportunity to enhance his 
or her network due to new relationships with these investors. We thus utilize an instrumental variable 
approach to study the causal relationship between CEO centrality and IPO performance. In the first stage 
of the analysis, we use two instrumental variables that are directly related to CEO centrality but are unlikely 
to affect the IPO outcomes to create the instrumented centralities. We use the mean centrality of other CEOs 
in the same state13 as the IPO firm, and the IPO firm’s corporate social responsibility index14 (CSR) as the 
instrumental variables for the CEO centrality. Then, in the second stage, we use the instrumented centrality 
to regress IPO performance. Table 9 presents the results of the instrumental variable approach analysis. 
Panel A columns (1) and (2) show the first stage of the analysis. The two instrumental variables are 
positively significant in predicting CEO centralities. The columns (3) and (4) in Table 9 reports the analysis 
of IPO underpricing using the instrumented CEO degree and eigenvector centralities, respectively. We 
show that both instrumented centrality measures are highly significant15. The Panels B and C of Table 
present the regression estimations of the probabilities of positive offer price revision and insider wealth 
gain, respectively. The instrumented centrality measures in those results are all highly significant with the 
same sign as in our main analysis reported in Table 5 and 6. Therefore, possible endogeneity thus likely 
does not create interpretation issues for the results reported in this paper. 
  
                                                          
13 We collect the centrality of all the S&P 1500 firms in the same state as the IPO firm in the same year of the IPO, 
and calculate the mean of the CEOs’ centrality. 
14 We follow Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo (2017) to create an index ranges from -5 to 5 to reflect the firm’s 
performance in community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and human rights, and use the median index 
within the sample period for each firm. 
15 It is not surprising, though, that the coefficients of the instrumented centrality measures are larger than those of 
the centrality measures because the instrumented centrality measures are the local average of the centrality 
conditional on the centrality determinants and that the standard error of the coefficient estimation is significantly 
larger, which is the price to pay for a variable to be considered as endogenous (Wooldridge 2015).  
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Table 9 Instrumental Variable Approach Analysis of IPO Performance 
This table presents the results of the instrumental variable approach analysis of IPO Performance. Panel A 
columns (1) and (2) presents the regression results of the CEO centrality with instrumental variables. Mean 
Degree (Eigenvector) Centrality of CEOs in Same State is the average of all CEOs of the S&P 1500 firms 
in the same state as the IPO firm in the same year. Firm CSR is the median of the company’s social 
responsibility index based on Lins et al. (2017) across all sample period. Columns (3) and (4) presents the 
results of OLS regression estimates of first-day return of IPO firms on instrumented centrality measures of 
CEOs and other control variables. Panel B presents the result probit regression estimates of positive price 
revision of IPO firms on instrumented centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes 1 if there is a positive price revision from middle filling 
price to offer price and 0 otherwise. Panel C presents the probit regression estimates of insider wealth gain 
of IPO firms on instrumented centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent 
variable is a dummy that takes 1 if there is an insider wealth gain and 0 otherwise. All other variables are 
as previously explained. All models include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Instrumented Centrality and IPO Underpricing 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return 
Degree 
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
IPO 
Underpricing 
IPO 
Underpricing 
        
Mean Degree Centrality of CEOs in Same 
State 0.0193***    
 (0.00531)    
Mean Eigenvector Centrality of CEOs in 
Same State  0.0155***   
  (0.00508)   
Firm CSR 0.115* 0.141**   
 (0.0601) (0.0549)   
Instrumented Degree Centrality   1.828**  
   (0.834)  
Instrumented Eigenvector Centrality    1.108** 
    (0.551) 
Firm Size 0.0233 0.0150 -0.0801** -0.0352* 
 (0.0186) (0.0114) (0.0403) (0.0208) 
Float ratio -358,453** -289,516 -63,927 -95,378** 
 (155,684) (188,721) (44,242) (47,680) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) 0.0163 0.0171 -0.181** -0.118* 
 (0.0358) (0.0263) (0.0898) (0.0640) 
Underwriter ranking 0.0779 0.129 -0.0287 -0.0307 
 (0.0931) (0.113) (0.0229) (0.0227) 
NYSE 0.0372 0.0501 0.0242 0.00584 
 (0.0474) (0.0400) (0.0210) (0.0182) 
Ventured backed IPO 0.144*** 0.105** -0.546* -0.276 
 (0.0544) (0.0502) (0.286) (0.171) 
Price revision -0.285* -0.277** 4.504** 2.941** 
 (0.147) (0.134) (1.947) (1.272) 
Firm age 0.000793 0.000397 -0.000476 8.68e-05 
 (0.000640) (0.000590) (0.000354) (0.000439) 
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Table 9 Instrumental Variable Approach Analysis of IPO Performance (Cont.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return 
Degree 
Centrality 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
IPO 
Underpricing 
IPO 
Underpricing 
Price revision residual   -3.780* -2.239* 
   (1.945) (1.272) 
CEO connected with banker   -0.0604 -0.0420 
   (0.0442) (0.0399) 
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO   -0.00633 -0.00271 
   (0.00556) (0.00419) 
Constant 2.535*** 2.782*** -5.707** -3.401* 
 (0.417) (0.402) (2.635) (1.753) 
     
Observations 629 629 628 628 
Adjusted R-squared 0.076 0.070 0.256 0.251 
Panel B: Instrumented Centrality and IPO Positive Price Revision 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive offer price revision) Degree Eigenvector 
      
Instrumented Degree Centrality -3.366***  
 (0.595)  
Instrumented Eigenvector Centrality  -3.699*** 
  (0.586) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) 0.538*** 0.574*** 
 (0.0959) (0.0981) 
Firm Size 0.119*** 0.0918** 
 (0.0417) (0.0402) 
NYSE -0.175 -0.126 
 (0.147) (0.148) 
Ventured backed IPO 1.053*** 1.011*** 
 (0.176) (0.164) 
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO 0.0186 0.0211 
 (0.0171) (0.0171) 
Firm age -0.000975 -0.00229 
 (0.00247) (0.00236) 
CEO connected with banker -0.0499 -0.0160 
 (0.239) (0.232) 
Constant 10.57*** 11.81*** 
 (2.365) (2.319) 
   
Observations 629 629 
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.140 
Panel C: Instrumented Centrality and Insider Wealth Effect 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain) Degree Eigenvector 
      
Instrumented Degree Centrality -1.868***  
 (0.556)  
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Table 9 Instrumental Variable Approach Analysis of IPO Performance (Cont.) 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain) Degree Eigenvector 
      
Instrumented Eigenvector Centrality  -2.839*** 
  (0.589) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) 0.365*** 0.415*** 
 (0.0847) (0.0864) 
Firm Size 0.0347 0.0228 
 (0.0375) (0.0382) 
Float ratio -1.557e+06*** -1.859e+06*** 
 (431,599) (418,025) 
CEO connected with banker 0.143 0.193 
 (0.242) (0.236) 
Firm age -0.00566** -0.00618*** 
 (0.00237) (0.00231) 
Residual of initial return 2.726*** 2.863*** 
 (0.378) (0.388) 
Constant 6.955*** 10.81*** 
 (2.378) (2.471) 
   
Observations 628 628 
Pseudo R-squared 0.129 0.146 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
3.6.2 Centrality determinants and excess centrality 
In this paper, we argue that higher underpricing, lower likelihood of positive price revisions, and lower 
likelihood of positive wealth effects for the pre-IPO shareholders are all due to CEOs who have superior 
network positions, and thus are likely to possess greater “social capital.” At the same time, CEOs who have 
superior skills – and thus possess greater “human capital” – may have easier time networking, as many 
individuals likely enjoy being connected to skilled managers. Simultaneously, more skilled CEOs may have 
superior entrenchment abilities, greater opportunities to benefit from their insider trades, etc. Consequently, 
our findings of links between CEO centrality and IPO outcomes may also be due to CEO human capital, 
and not just CEO network-related social capital. In this section, we address whether the relations attributed 
to network centrality in our paper may be partially due to omitted variables associated with centrality (both 
individual characteristics and firm-specific variables) in addition to network effects captured by centrality. 
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In order to analyze the role of potentially omitted centrality determinants, we employ the “excess 
centrality” developed by El-Khatib et al. (2015). “Excess centrality” is defined as the residual from 
regression of centrality (degree or eigenvector) on CEO personal attributes and firm characteristics. A CEO 
with high “excess centrality” should be again considered influential and powerful, but “excess centrality” 
is now unrelated to the individual- and firm-related determinants of centrality.  
We rerun all of the models presented in Tables 4-6 with centrality variables replaced by “excess 
centrality”. The centrality determinants considered include: (a) number of boards of public and private firms 
the CEO is a member of, (b) number of sectors the CEO worked in, (c) CEO age, (d) CEO tenure on the 
company’s board, and (e) firm’s (sales) size. The results are shown in Table 10 Panels A, B, and C for the 
estimations of IPO underpricing, probability of positive offer price revision, and probability of insider 
wealth gain, respectively. Our results have very similar high significances, and identical signs, suggesting 
that the centrality measures indeed reflect the impact of CEO network (social capital) effects, as opposed 
to the impact of omitted variables. 
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Table 10 Analysis of IPO Performance and Excess Centrality 
This table presents the results of the analysis of IPO Performance on excess CEO centrality measures. 
Excess centrality is defined as the residual from regression of centrality (degree or eigenvector) on number 
of boards of public and private firms the CEO is a member of, number of sectors the CEO worked in, CEO 
age, CEO tenure on the company’s board, and firm’s (sales) size. Panel A presents the results of OLS 
regression estimates of first-day return of IPO firms on excess centrality measures of CEOs and other 
control variables. Panel B presents the result probit regression estimates of positive price revision of IPO 
firms on excess centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if there is a positive price revision from middle filling price to offer price and 
0 otherwise. Panel C presents the probit regression estimates of insider wealth gain of IPO firms on excess 
centrality measures of CEOs, and other control variables. The dependent variable is a dummy that takes 1 
if there is an insider wealth gain and 0 otherwise. All other variables are as previously explained. All models 
include year effects. Robust standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Excess Centrality and IPO Underpricing 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable = IPO first-day return Degree Eigenvector 
Excess Degree Centrality 0.0420**  
 (0.0190)  
Excess Eigenvector Centrality  0.0567** 
  (0.0266) 
Firm Size -0.0117 -0.0106 
 (0.00985) (0.00957) 
Float ratio -104,565*** -107,264*** 
 (31,946) (32,182) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) -0.0981* -0.0962* 
 (0.0527) (0.0530) 
Underwriter ranking 0.0193 0.0194 
 (0.0186) (0.0188) 
NYSE 0.0309 0.0291 
 (0.0245) (0.0242) 
Ventured backed IPO -0.0854 -0.0829 
 (0.0721) (0.0726) 
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO 0.00101 0.00135 
 (0.00263) (0.00254) 
Price revision 3.660*** 3.541** 
 (1.408) (1.380) 
Firm age 0.000726 0.000710 
 (0.000588) (0.000589) 
CEO connected with banker -0.0176 -0.0159 
 (0.0346) (0.0341) 
Price revision residual -3.096** -2.977** 
 (1.411) (1.383) 
Constant 0.749** 0.734** 
 (0.334) (0.335) 
   
Observations 782 781 
Adjusted R-squared 0.243 0.242 
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Table 10 Analysis of IPO Performance and Excess Centrality (Cont.) 
Panel B: Excess Centrality and IPO Positive Price Revision 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive offer price revision) Degree Eigenvector 
      
Excess Degree Centrality -0.0878  
 (0.0986)  
Excess Eigenvector Centrality  -0.202* 
  (0.103) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) 0.416*** 0.421*** 
 (0.0713) (0.0721) 
Firm Size 0.00383 0.00430 
 (0.0322) (0.0323) 
NYSE -0.209* -0.207* 
 (0.126) (0.126) 
Ventured backed IPO 0.247** 0.267** 
 (0.111) (0.112) 
Nasdaq return 2 weeks prior to IPO 0.0122 0.0113 
 (0.0152) (0.0152) 
Firm age -0.00293 -0.00297 
 (0.00209) (0.00208) 
CEO connected with banker -0.00116 0.00781 
 (0.209) (0.208) 
Constant -1.830*** -1.863*** 
 (0.440) (0.443) 
   
Observations 798 797 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0698 0.0720 
Panel C: Excess Centrality and Insider Wealth Effect 
  (1) (2) 
Dep. Variable = Prob(positive insider wealth gain) Degree Eigenvector 
      
Excess Degree Centrality -0.0730  
 (0.101)  
Excess Eigenvector Centrality  -0.238** 
  (0.0960) 
Ln(IPO proceeds) 0.414*** 0.424*** 
 (0.0690) (0.0704) 
Firm Size 0.0367 0.0343 
 (0.0323) (0.0325) 
Float ratio -954,628*** -1.038e+06*** 
 (276,521) (273,534) 
CEO connected with banker 0.0769 0.0975 
 (0.221) (0.220) 
Firm age -0.00666*** -0.00671*** 
 (0.00222) (0.00223) 
Residual of initial return 3.739*** 3.767*** 
 (0.394) (0.396) 
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Table 10 Analysis of IPO Performance and Excess Centrality (Cont.) 
Constant -1.276*** -1.279*** 
 (0.440) (0.444) 
Observations 782 781 
Pseudo R-squared 0.169 0.172 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
3.7 Robustness Analysis 
3.7.1 Firm size effect 
High centrality CEOs are more likely to manage larger firms. To control for the possibility that our 
centrality variables proxy for potentially non-linear size effects, in unreported analysis we utilize three 
methods used by El-Khatib et al. (2015): (a) we add a “large firm size” dummy, (b) we add a quadratic size 
variables, and (c) we split our sample into two subsamples based on firm size, Regardless of the method 
utilized, CEO centrality remains significant determinant of IPO underpricing (Table 4), likelihood of 
positive price revisions (Table 5), and likelihood of positive insider IPO wealth effects (Table 6). 
Consequently, it is unlikely that our findings are due to the firm size effect. 
3.7.2 The impact of CEO overconfidence 
Overconfident people may be more likely to build large personal networks. Consequently, high CEO 
centrality may be positively related to overconfidence. Finance literature finds that overconfident CEOs 
tend to make decisions that are not to the best interest of the shareholders. For example, Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) and Roll (1986) find that CEO overconfidence may cause losses in mergers and acquisition. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) find that overconfident CEOs tend to overestimate the return of the investment 
and overinvest. As our paper suggest that high-centrality CEOs may be associated with risky IPOs less 
likely to generate benefits for existing shareholders, we need to address the potential positive link between 
CEO centrality and overconfidence. 
In order to separate CEO network effects (proxied by centrality) and overconfidence, in unreported 
analysis, we include overconfidence measures in all of our models in Tables 4-6. The overconfidence 
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measures are constructed following the models from Otto (2014) and Malmendier and Tate (2008).16 The 
inclusion of any of the overconfidence measures does not change the signs and high significance levels of 
the centrality coefficients. In addition, we uncover that overconfidence and centrality are negatively 
correlated in our sample. Consequently, our results regarding the role of CEO centrality in the IPO process 
are unlikely to be due to CEO overconfidence. 
3.7.3 The impact of CEO age 
It may be possible that our findings regarding CEO centrality may be due to firms trying to hire 
experienced and “visible” CEO right before the firm’s IPO. Thus, in unreported analysis, we include CEO’s 
age and years in position and interact with centrality measures in our models. The original centrality 
determinants retain the same signs and very similar significances as those reported in Tables 4-6, while the 
interactive coefficients are mostly insignificant. Moreover, we find that the coefficient for the years in 
position is not statistically significant. Hence, we find evidence that our results are neither determined by 
CEO tenure, nor driven by firms seeking high centrality CEOs right before IPO. 
4. Conclusion 
We show that CEO network centrality is statistically and economically meaningful determinant of IPO 
outcomes. IPOs of firms with high centrality CEOs are associated with significantly greater underpricing 
returns. These IPOs also have a lower likelihood of positive offer price adjustments from their initial filing 
range, as well as a lower likelihood of generating positive net IPO wealth effects for the pre-IPO 
shareholders. Our results suggest that new investors may perceive IPOs with well-connected CEOs as 
riskier. In addition, we find that well-connected CEOs are less likely to be replaced in case of poor post-
IPO performance, consistent with higher entrenchment of high centrality CEOs in post IPO firms. Also, we 
show that high centrality CEOs are more likely to sell company’s stock for personal benefit at the cost of 
the shareholders, indicated by a lower abnormal return following their personal sales of the securities. These 
                                                          
16 Malmendier and Tate (2008) identify overconfident executives based on their decision to hold (rather than optimally 
exercise) their in-the-money options. Otto (2014) utilizes firm’s voluntary earnings forecasts to classify overconfident 
managers. 
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findings are consistent with high centrality CEOs being able to utilize their influence and power derived 
from higher positions within the social network hierarchy to entrench themselves and to thwart optimal 
corporate governance. Last, we document additional risks associated with CEOs who network “inefficiently” 
(that is, whose networks have many links, but lack influential connections). Namely, underpricing is higher, 
and the chance of positive net wealth effects lower for IPOs with low eigenvector centrality CEOs, if they 
also have high degree centralities. 
We contribute to the growing literature on social networks in finance. Our paper is the first to show 
that individual position within social network hierarchy – which leads to higher influence and power, and 
can be proxied by social network centrality – affects IPO outcomes. We provide an extension of previous 
research chiefly based on bilateral connections (e.g. Engelberg et al. 2012; Ishii and Xuan, 2014; Cai and 
Sevilir, 2012; Cohen et al., 2010). In addition, our results are consistent with detrimental impact of CEO 
centrality on wealth of pre-IPO shareholders, and thus they provide an important contrast to existing 
research on social networks in the context of IPO, which has so far mainly documented benefits of networks 
due to bilateral connections between IPO managers and underwriters (Cooney et al., 2015), or due to high 
firm-specific centrality of underwriters (Chuluun, 2015). 
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Chapter 2 
Personal Connections, Financial Advisors, and M&A Outcomes 
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1. Introduction 
Merge and Acquisitions (M&A) are some of the most important decisions a firm’s leadership could 
make, and they do not usually make the decisions on their own, but rather consult an outside advisor (Bao 
& Edmans 2011). Given the substantial value implication that an M&A deal could have on the 
shareholder, it is crucial that the financial advisor hired in the process could have effective functions in 
assessing, negotiating, and executing or halt the deal. The firm’s leadership and the board should also 
have a strong responsibility on the due diligence. Most importantly, such efforts from the financial 
advisor and the firm should not be diminished by the potential conflict of interest or collusion as a result 
of the social ties between the bidder firm’s leadership and that of the financial advisor. In this paper, we 
examine how the personal social ties between a firm’s top leadership, which are CEO, CFO, COO, the 
President, and the Chair of the Board, and those of the financial advisor affects the M&A performance of 
the bidder firm. 
Whether and how do financial advisors matter in a merge and acquisition deal? Finance literature has 
much advances on this topic, but the results have not been conclusive. Bowers and Miller (1990) do not 
find a relationship between value creation for the bidder and the choice of using a first-tier investment 
banker. Servaes and Zenner (1996) find that the announcement returns for those firms hiring investment 
banks are lower than those do not. On the other hand, however, more recent literature find that the 
financial advisors do matter in an M&A or corporate takeover deal. Kale et al. (2003) document wealth 
gains to the bidder as the reputation of the bidder advisor increases relative to that of the target advisor. 
Bao and Edmans (2011) find a significant impact of the investment banks on M&A outcomes, contrasting 
earlier studies. Golubov et al. (2012) document a significantly higher bidder announcement return, higher 
success rate, and faster deal completion time that is associated with using a top-tier financial advisor in 
M&A deals when the target is a public company. 
We build on the findings of Golubov et al. (2012) and examine the impact of financial advisors on 
M&A deals from the perspective of the social network, a topic that has been receiving increased attention 
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in finance literature. Some literature find evidence showing that social ties have positive impact on M&A 
and IPO outcomes. Cai and Sevilir (2012), using a sample of U.S. M&As, document that the 
announcement returns are higher for those M&As where a common director is shared by the acquirer and 
target company. Renneboog and Zhao (2014), with a U.K. sample, report that the board connection 
between the acquirer and the target, measured as when there are one or more common directors exists, is 
associated with a higher likelihood of success takeover and shorter period of time for negotiation. They, 
however, do not find a significant impact of such connections on the announcement return. Cooney et al. 
(2015) find that when the directors and the executives of the underwriter and the IPO firm are connected 
through personal networks, the pre-IPO shareholders of the IPO firm are more likely to have a positive 
wealth gain, and the investment bank receives a higher compensation and a greater share allocation of the 
IPO firm, on average. Other literature document some negative or mixed impact of social networks on 
M&As and corporate governance. El-Khatib et al. (2015) find that bidder CEOs that are in a more central 
location of their personal connections are associated with more value losses to the acquirer and the 
combined business entity. Schmidt (2015) asserts that the social ties between CEO and the board can 
affect merger announcement return under different circumstances. He finds that when the value of board 
advice is high, the social ties are associated with a higher announcement return, but on the other hand, he 
finds that the social ties have a negative impact on acquirer performance, when the needs of high board 
monitoring outweighs the benefit from board advising. 
The financial advisors in an M&A deal are expected to play a role of certification (Allen et al. 2004). 
More specifically, a financial advisor helps a buy-side client to collect information, evaluate a perspective 
target, perform due diligence, assess the value impact of the acquisition on the buy side, and negotiate and 
execute the deal if feasible. In other words, a deal should never be executed if it is deemed to be not 
value-creating to the bidder. We assert that the prior social connections between the senior executive 
members of the bidder and those of the financial advisor may impact the certification role of the financial 
advisor and thus affect the performance of an M&A deal. One the one hand, literature has find that social 
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connections facilitate transmission of private information, business idea, and knowledge. For example, an 
extensive social network may facilitate the transmission of information among executives from different 
business organizations and thus may help firms to score better loan contracts (Engelberg et al. 2012), 
achieve better analyst performance (Cohen et al. 2010), improve portfolio management performance 
(Cohen et al. 2008), gain better M&A synergies (Cai & Sevilir 2012), and have a better overall corporate 
performance (Fracassi 2016).  
On the other hand, however, social connections between the decision makers may interfere with 
optimal decision making, corporate governance, and value creating for the shareholders. For example, 
social ties among persons have been found to weaken the corporate governance and the monitoring 
effects on the managers (Fracassi & Tate 2012), to increase transaction costs (Cai et al. 2016), to 
encourage collusion among managers at the expenses of the shareholders (Ishii & Xuan 2014), and to 
have a worse IPO outcome (Jandik et al. 2016). 
The question remains unanswered is how the social connections between the acquirer and their 
financial advisors affects the performance of an M&A deal. If the social connections between them help 
the financial advisors better learn the private information of the bidder firm, then such connections should 
help the financial advisor better certify and assess the deal, resulting in a better outcome. However, if 
such social connections encourage collusion between the bidder and the advisor, where nonprofitable 
deals are done, from which the advisors collect fees and CEO of the bidder firm enjoys a bigger power of 
governance and monetary incentives, then the shareholder’s value would be destroyed, and such deals 
would not be valued favorably by the financial market upon announcement. 
We Use a sample of 675 M&A deals in the United States from 2000 to 2016 and use BoardEx to 
identify personal connections from prior common work experience in public and private firms between 
the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of Board of the bidder firms and those of bidder firms’ 
financial advisors. Our results show that the announcement returns of the deals with personal connection 
between the bidders and their advisors are 1.59% lower than those of the deals where no such personal 
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connection exist, which is a sizable difference given a -0.35% median bidder announcement CAR. 
However, choosing a financial advisor is affected by deal characteristics (Francis et al. 2014), and that 
which financial advisor to hire is a choice of the bidder firm, resulting in a potential selection bias 
(Golubov et al. 2012). Therefore, we consider the endogeneity issues in the matching of bidder and their 
advisor and control for the endogeneity by using the two-stage procedure proposed by Heckman (1979) 
and the switching regression model with endogenous switching, an extension of Heckman (1979) model 
used by Golubov et al. (2012). Our results show that, controlling for endogeneity, a bidder that personally 
connects to their financial advisor would have done a better deal if the financial advisor was not 
connected – or an 1.35% improvement in CAR. A non-connected bidder could have performed worse, 
had they connected to their financial advisor – a -3.11% change in CAR. We also use the propensity score 
matching proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to match each sample with bidder-bidder advisor 
connections to a sample without such connection but has the closest propensity of having so. The results 
show that the CAR of the sample with bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is 1.58% lower than 
their matched sample. To further solidify the exclusion of endogeneity, we add an additional variable, the 
number of professional associations in the headquarter county of the bidder, as a predictor of personal 
connections between the bidder and their financial advisors. The number of professional associations in 
the headquarter county of the bidder is significant in determining the personal connection, and the inverse 
mills ratios we derive from the first stage of the Heckman procedure are not significant in the second 
stage, nor are they significant in the switch regressions we subsequently perform. Thus, the negative 
relations between the personal connection and the announcement CAR we find are not likely due to the 
endogenous selection of the financial advisor by the bidder or due to the selection bias from the samples 
that we observe. 
We then investigate how personal connections between bidder and bidder financial advisors affect the 
probability of completion of the deal and duration of time for deal completion. The results show that a 
personal connection between the bidder and bidder advisor is positively associated with the likelihood of 
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deal completion, and that for those completed deals where the target is a public company, the duration 
between deal announcement and deal completion is 16.8% longer for those deals with bidder-bidder 
advisor connections. These results indicate that deals with bidder-bidder advisor connections are more 
likely to be taken into effective but are executed in a less efficient and timely manner. 
We then further examine the possible channels that motivates the deals that are value-destroying to 
the bidder shareholders. The financial advisors receive substantial amount of fees from the M&A deals 
worldwide (Hunter & Jagtiani 2003; Golubov et al. 2012), and if a personal connection between the 
bidder and bidder financial advisor prompts collusion, then the financial advisors are likely to be paid 
more for advising the deal. Using data from 265 deals where the financial advisor fees are disclosed, we 
find that the unconditional mean for the advisor fees paid by the bidder is 25.87 million US dollars when 
the bidder and bidder advisor are personally connected, and 11.40 million when not connected. After 
controlling for financial advisor reputation, deal and firm characteristics, following Golubov et al. (2012), 
we, in a subsample of 121 deals with data availability, find that the fees paid by the bidders are 57.6% 
higher when personal connections between bidder and bidder-advisor exist than those fees when no 
personal connections exist, controlling for deal and firm characteristics. Our results provide evidence that 
the premium fees paid by the bidder are not due to the quality and the reputation of the financial advisor, 
nor due to the nature of the deal, but are due to the personal connections between the bidder and their 
advisors. 
Lastly, we investigate the impact of the personal connections between bidder and bidder financial 
advisor and the cash bonus of the bidder CEO receives in the year the M&A deal completes. Literature 
has documented that the CEOs of the acquiring firm commonly receive incentives following a successful 
acquisition, and such incentives are almost all in the form of cash bonus (Grinstein & Hribar 2004). 
Following Ishii and Xuan (2014), we focus on the cash bonus that the CEOs of the acquiring companies 
receive in the year of merger completion. From the 350 deals where the cash bonus is paid to the CEO of 
the acquiring company in the year the deal successfully completes, we show that unconditionally, the 
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CEOs are paid 88.7% more cash bonus when there are personal connections between the bidder and 
bidder financial advisors than when there are no such conditions. The ratio reduces to 48.2% when we 
control for financial advisor reputation, deal characteristics, and firm financial of the year. Given an 
average of 1.87 billion U.S. dollar cash bonus, our finding translates into about 900 thousand dollars more 
cash bonus compensation for the CEOs when personal connections between the bidder and their financial 
advisor exists, which is substantial. 
Our results are robust under various of alternative model specification and controls. First, one concern 
is that the significant results we find about the personal connections between the bidder and their advisor 
and the outcome of the M&A deals is due to the proximity of the bidder and their advisor, not their actual 
prior connections. Therefore, we always include the geographical difference between the bidder and their 
advisor in all models to directly control for that, and all our results hold. Second, given that Golubov et al. 
(2012) find that the reputation of the financial advisor matters in public deals, we include a dummy 
variable indicating whether a deal is advised by a top financial advisor or not, and also include public 
target dummy variable in our analysis. Our results still remain unchanged, and the interaction between the 
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection and the top financial advisor does not appear to be significant 
and affect our results. Third, our main results still hold if we either control for the fact whether the target 
hires a financial advisor, or whether the personal connections between the target and their financial 
advisor. Our results are also similar if we use different time window to estimate the CAR around the 
merger announcement, or if we use different measures to control for the bidder size (Moeller et al. 2004). 
Therefore, the results we find are not due to the geographical distance of the bidder and their advisors, the 
connections or hiring of target advisor, or the size effect of the bidder. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we extend the literature of social ties in 
finance and show the economic value of such connections. We show that the social ties of the senior 
executives with the financial advisors matter in the M&A context. Our results suggest that such 
connections are more detrimental than beneficial, which means they are more likely to help the executives 
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and the financial advisors to score personal interests than earn economic benefits for the bidder 
shareholders. Second, we are the first to investigate how the social connections between bidder and their 
advisor may affect the outcome of M&A transactions. We add evidence to the M&A literature about 
social ties that the connections between bidder and their advisor diminish the certification effect of the 
advisor, resulting in more value-destroying deals. Lastly, we offer insights about how financial market 
perceives such personal connections between corporate major decision makers and find that these 
connections are perceived negatively by the market upon the announcement of the M&A deal. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data, section 3 presents the empirical results, 
and section 4 concludes. 
2. Data 
2.1 Social Connection Data 
We obtain the social connection data of the acquirers and their financial advisors from BoardEx 
through Wharton Research Data Services. BoardEx database records bilateral connections of the board 
members and senior executives of the firms all over the world. Those connections include overlapping 
private firms, public firms, government and military employment history, education, and social clubs. 
BoardEx also contains the demographical information of the individuals the database includes. In our 
paper, we consider the bidder firm is connected to their financial advisor if the CEO, CFO, COO, 
President, or the Chair of the Board17 of either side has overlapped employment background in private or 
public firm prior to the announcement year of the M&A transaction with the CEO, CFO, COO, President, 
or the Chair of the Board of the other side. We only use the employment-based connection because such 
connections are believed to be most reliable and trackable. Other types of connections like education are 
                                                          
17 Our results are similar if we only consider connections between CEO and CFO of the bidder and those of the 
financial advisor. 
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not reliable, considering the large enrollment of a public university18, where two individuals graduating in 
the same year may not even have known each other throughout the 4 years of time attending the same 
university. 
2.2 M&A and Firm Characteristics 
We obtain M&A data from Tomson Reuters SDC Database with the announcement date from 2000 to 
2016, both acquirer and target being a United States firm. We exclude liquidations, bankruptcy 
acquisition, going private, leverage buyout, privatization, restructuring and reverse takeover. We also 
ensure that the samples are either a merger (code “M” in SDC), or acquisition of majority interest (code 
“AM” in SDC). The deal should also have transaction value and payment methods non-missing. 
Additionally, we require the bidder has stock return data available from CRSP and financial data available 
from COMPUSTAT. We follow Golubov et al. (2012) and use SDC League Tables to identify the top 8 
financial advisors19 by the value of the deal they advised during our sample period. 
We then merge the social connection data with the M&A data. We only keep those M&A deals that 
BoardEx has coverage for both acquirer firm and their financial advisors to ensure accuracy of our 
connection data. We also exclude those deals where no financial advisor is used for the acquirer side. Our 
final sample contains a total of 675 M&A deals. For the final sample, we use ExecuComp to collect the 
data of the cash bonus of the CEO in the year of the M&A deal completion. We also use the data20 from 
Rupasingha et al. (2006) for the measure of social capital capacity. We use the number of establishments 
in professional organizations in the county of the acquirers’ headquarters as an additional determinant of 
the connection between the acquirer and their advisor.  
                                                          
18 It is common for some large public universities to consistently have enrollment of more than 50,000 in any given 
year in the most recent years. For example, Texas A&M University, the Ohio State University, Arizona State 
University, and University of Central Florida, according to Wikipedia (2018). 
19 The top 8 financial advisors are: JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs & Co, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Morgan 
Stanley, Citi, Barclays, Credit Suisse Group, and Commerzbank AG. 
20 The data is available from the website of Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development of The Pennsylvania 
State University. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables in the analysis. Bidder Connection to 
Advisor is a dummy variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection between the 
CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor. 
Bidder CAR is the cumulative abnormal return of the bidding firm from 2 days prior to to 2 days after the 
announcement. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the 
top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Deal Size to Total Assets is the deal value 
reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. 
Market Value is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the announcement multiply by the 
number of shares outstanding. Market Adjusted Runups is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the 
bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Sigma is the standard 
deviation of the daily stock return of the bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the 
announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the 
deal, and 0 otherwise. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total 
liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets. 
Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Liquidity is the cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred stock divided by 
the number of shares outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that takes one if the bidder and the target are in 
the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer is a dummy variable that takes one if the 
offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a dummy that takes one if the target firm is a 
listed company, and zero otherwise. Distance between Bidder and Advisor is the direct distance between 
the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Deal Completion is a dummy variable that takes one if 
the deal is eventually effective as shown in the SDC and zero otherwise. Bidder Advisor Fee is the fee 
paid to the bidder advisor reported by SDC. CEO Cash Bonus is the cash bonus received by the CEO of 
the bidder in the year the M&A deal completes. Days to Resolution if Success is the number of calendar 
days from the announcement date to the effective date for the deals bid by a listed firm. 
 
 Unit N Mean p10 p50 p90 
Standard 
Deviation 
Bidder Connection to Advisor Binary 675 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 
Bidder CAR   675 0.00 -0.09 0.00 0.09 0.08 
Top Advisor Hired Binary 675 0.62 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.49 
Deal Size to Total Assets   675 2.03 0.02 0.19 0.91 34.11 
Market Value Billion $ 675 22.09 0.64 4.65 64.04 48.54 
Market Adjusted Runups  675 0.12 -0.25 0.05 0.46 0.51 
Sigma   675 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 
Cash Payment Used Binary 675 0.83 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.38 
ROA   675 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.14 0.09 
Tobin’s Q   675 2.25 1.08 1.74 3.79 2.09 
Leverage   675 0.22 0.00 0.19 0.47 0.19 
Liquidity   675 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.10 
Same Industry Deal Binary 675 0.67 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.47 
Tender Offer Binary 675 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.38 
Target is Public Binary 675 0.70 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics (Cont.) 
 Unit N Mean p10 p50 p90 
Standard 
Deviation 
Distance between Bidder and Advisor Miles 675 932.10 19.78 706.10 2,461.00 874.90 
Deal Completion Binary 675 0.89 0.00 1 1 0.31 
Bidder Advisor Fee Million $ 265 13.75 0.58 8.00 35.00 16.03 
CEO Cash Bonus Million $ 350 1.91 0.18 1.05 5.00 2.86 
Days to Resolution if Success   406 122.4 43 101 240 79.58 
 
The summary statistics of our final sample is presented in Table 1. 21% of our sample has bidder-
bidder financial advisor connections, and 62% of our sample have been advised by a top bidder financial 
advisor. The average direct distance between a typical bidder and their advisor is 932 miles. A typical 
deal in our sample as an announcement CAR of 0.04%, a deal value to total asset of 2.03, a market 
adjustment runup from 205 days to 6 days prior to the announcement of 11.65%, and a standard deviation 
of the daily stock return during the same period of 2.04%. 67% of the sample deals are same-industry deal 
where the bidder and the target are in the same industry, 17% of the deals are tender offers, 70% of the 
deals involve a public target, and 83% of the deals involve cash payment. A typical bidder in our sample 
has a total market value of 22.1 billion U.S. dollars, based on the stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement date, a return on asset of 5.75%, a Tobin’s Q of 2.25, a leverage of 0.22, and a cash flow to 
equity ratio of 6.97%, all based on the Compustat data in the year prior to the announcement year. Based 
on the SDC data availability, the bidder advisor fees are disclosed in 265 deals, of which the mean advisor 
fee is 13.75 million U.S. dollars. 350 CEOs are reported to have received cash bonus in the year the M&A 
deal is complete, and the mean bonus is 1.91 million U.S. dollars. It takes a typical deal with a public 
target 122 days to resolve, if the deal is eventually complete. 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Bidder-Bidder Financial Advisor Connections and Bidder CAR 
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We first examine how the connections between bidder and their advisor affect the announcement 
CAR of the bidder. According to the prior literature, we control for the deal and firm characteristics that 
have found to impact bidder announcement CAR. We control for the bidder size (Moeller et al. 2004), 
Tobin’s q (Lang et al. 1989; Servaes 1991), leverage (Maloney et al. 1993; Billett et al. 2004), 
profitability (Lang et al. 1991), and cash flow to equity ratio (Jensen 1986; Lang et al. 1991; Smith & 
Kim 1994). We also control for bidder financial advisor reputation, which is related to the bidder CAR 
according to Golubov et al. (2012). The bidder size is measured as the market value of the bidder 4 weeks 
prior to the announcement date. The Tobin’s q is measured as the sum of the book value of debt and 
market value of equity divided by total asset. The leverage is the total debt to total asset ratio. The 
profitability is the return on asset. The cash flow to equity ratio is measured as the income before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common stock and preferred stock divided by 
the total market value of the equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. All these firm 
financial data is based on the fiscal year end immediately prior to the announcement year. We also control 
for the M&A deal related characteristics that may affect bidder CAR, which are relative deal size (Fuller 
et al. 2002), bidder stock run-ups (Rosen 2006), bidder stock return volatility (Moeller et al. 2007), cash 
payment being used (Travlos 1987), same-industry deal (Morck et al. 1990), tender offer (Jensen & 
Ruback 1983), and target firm being public (Golubov et al. 2012). Relative deal size is the natural 
logarithm of deal value to the bidder total assets. The bidder stock runups is the market adjust return of 
the bidder stock during 205 to 6 days prior to the announcement date. The bidder stock return volatility is 
the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the bidder during 205 to 6 days prior to the 
announcement date. The cash payment being used is a dummy that takes 1 if cash is used to pay for the 
acquisition and 0 otherwise. Same-industry deal is a dummy that takes 1 if the acquirer and the target are 
in the same industry, and 0 other wise. The target firm being public is a dummy that takes 1 if the target is 
a publicly traded firm and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Bidder Announcement CAR 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CAR (-2,2) around the announcement 
date. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return of the bidding firm from 2 days prior to to 
2 days after the announcement.  Bidder Connection to Advisor is a dummy variable that takes one if an 
employment-based personal connection between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board 
exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one 
if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Relative Deal 
Size is the natural logarithm of deal value reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the 
year prior to the M&A announcement. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to 
the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the 
announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the 
bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy 
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on 
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the 
market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by 
the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided 
by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the 
cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus 
dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing 
stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that 
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer 
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a 
dummy that takes one if the target firm is a listed company, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor 
Distance is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. All models 
include year and industry fixed effect. Robust standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in 
the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection -0.0166** -0.0164** -0.0159** 
 (0.00752) (0.00757) (0.00762) 
Top Financial Advisor Dummy  -0.00153 0.000996 
  (0.00782) (0.00788) 
Relative Deal Size -0.00173 -0.00170 3.86e-05 
 (0.00307) (0.00310) (0.00313) 
Bidder Size -1.10e-07** -1.09e-07** -7.81e-08 
 (5.26e-08) (5.29e-08) (5.10e-08) 
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups -4.09e-05 -0.000116 -0.000791 
 (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0116) 
Bidder Stock Return Volatility 0.127 0.119 -0.0756 
 (0.471) (0.471) (0.476) 
Cash Payment Used 0.0224** 0.0224** 0.0194** 
 (0.00992) (0.00992) (0.00969) 
ROA 0.0207 0.0212 0.0180 
 (0.0615) (0.0616) (0.0599) 
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Table 2 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Bidder Announcement CAR (Cont.) 
 Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2) (1) (2) (3) 
    
Tobin's Q -0.00228 -0.00225 -0.00238 
 (0.00196) (0.00198) (0.00195) 
Leverage 0.0329 0.0330 0.0325 
 (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0223) 
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio 0.0543 0.0541 0.0529 
 (0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0492) 
Same Industry Deal 0.00679 0.00673 0.00869 
 (0.00703) (0.00704) (0.00700) 
Tender Offer 0.00405 0.00401 0.0140* 
 (0.00778) (0.00779) (0.00837) 
Target is Public   -0.0246*** 
   (0.00856) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance -1.01e-06 -9.91e-07 -7.69e-08 
 (4.22e-06) (4.25e-06) (4.24e-06) 
Constant -0.0632* -0.0625* -0.0560 
 (0.0329) (0.0322) (0.0367) 
    
Industry Dummy Y Y Y 
Year Dummy Y Y Y 
    
Observations 675 675 675 
Adjusted R-squared 0.073 0.071 0.086 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
 
The regression results are shown in Table 2. The dependent variable CAR (-2,2) is the cumulative 
abnormal return of the bidder from 2 days prior to the announcement date to 2 days after that. Year and 
industry fixed effect are included in all models, and the heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses. Column (1) presents our base model, where only the bidder financial 
characteristics and deal characteristics are included. The variable of interest is Bidder-bidder Advisor 
Connection, which is statistically significant and negative. This indicates that the existence of bidder-
bidder financial advisor connection negatively impacts the bidder CAR. We add control for top financial 
advisor dummy in column (2) and target firm being public dummy in column (3), as Golubov et al. 
(2012) find that those two factors matter in bidder CAR. Our key variable, Bidder-bidder Advisor 
Connection, is still negatively significant with those two controls. The coefficient in the column (3) 
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suggest that the connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor makes the bidder CAR 1.59% 
lower than if there was no connection exists. Other variables related to firm financial characteristics and 
deal characteristics are generally in the same directions as previous literature has predicted. Overall, our 
initial results indicate that the connection between bidder and their financial advisor has a negative impact 
on bidder CAR. 
3.2 Determinants of Bidder-Bidder Financial Advisor Connection and Selection Bias 
Correction 
Note that the results we find above assume that the connection between the bidder and their advisors 
are exogenously determined, which is plausible. In fact, such connection could also be determined 
endogenously by the firm characteristics and the deal characteristics. Furthermore, such connection can 
be affected by the availability of the financial advisor in the proximity of the bidder firm. If these 
suspicions hold true, there could be a selection bias exists, and the results we produce above could thus be 
unreliable, according to Heckman (1979). Therefore, we follow similar approach used by Golubov et al. 
(2012) using a two-step procedure to correct and control for the self-selection bias and endogeneity. 
In the first step we implement a probit model that predicts the likelihood of a connection exists 
between the bidder and bidder financial advisor. In the second stage, we use the inverse mills ratio 
derived from the first stage to correct the selection bias. Li and Prabhala (2007) suggest that it is ideal to 
include a variable in the first stage, but the same variable does not appear in the second stage. In other 
words, that variable should have an impact on the likelihood of the existence of a bidder-bidder financial 
advisor connection but does not have an impact on the outcome of the M&A transaction. We therefore 
include the number of establishments in professional organizations in the county of the acquirers’ 
headquarters as an additional determinant of the connection between the bidder and their advisor. We 
argue that more professional organizations in the county of the acquirer’s headquarter offer greater 
opportunities for the firm’s executive members to participate in more social events, engage in more 
business and employment activities, and thus increases the chance that they involve a financial advisor 
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that they have connection with in the M&A deal. However, the number of professional organizations in 
an area is unlikely to affect the performance of the firm in the M&A transaction. 
The column (1) of Table 3 reports the results of the probit model that estimates the likelihood of a 
connection between the bidder and their financial advisor. The Number of Professional Organizations 
variable is highly significant (at the 5% level), indicating the number of professional associations in the 
proximity of the headquarter of the bidder is positively related to the likelihood of the existence of bidder-
bidder financial advisor connection. The relative deal size is negatively associated with the probability of 
hiring a connected financial advisor, implying that those deals that are more important to the bidder are 
less likely to involve a connected financial advisor, likely because the negative effect of hiring a 
connected financial advisor is easily to be noticed due to the relative size of the deal to the bidder. The 
bidder size is positively related to hiring a connected financial advisor, and the advisor being a top banker 
is also positively associated with the probability of being included as a connected financial advisor. 
The columns (2) and (3) in Table 3 report the second stage of the Heckman procedure. In the second 
stage, we add an inverse Mills ratio, derived from the first stage of the Heckman procedure, as an 
additional independent variable. The column (2) represents the base model of our analysis, and the 
column (3) represents the model that includes the financial advisor reputation variable and the dummy 
indicating the target firm being public. The coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio in both models are not 
significant, indicating that there is no evidence of self-selection bias in our initial analysis. Nevertheless, 
we follow Golubov et al. (2012) and implement a switching regression approach with endogenous 
switching to estimate the effect of a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor on the bidder 
CAR. More specifically, we examine what the CAR would have been, if the M&A deal, which actually 
has bidder-bidder financial advisor connection, had been announced without the existence of bidder-
bidder financial advisor connection? Also, what the CAR could have been, if the deal without bidder-
bidder financial advisor connection had been announced with a connection between bidder and bidder 
financial advisor? We answer these two what-if questions by estimating OLS models on bidder CAR on 
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subsamples with and without bidder-bidder financial advisor connections, respectively, with the inverse 
Mills ratio we derived in the probit model described above included in all models. Table 4 Panel A 
reports the results of the switching regression models, and Panel B reports the results of the what-if 
analysis. 
Table 3 Heckman Two-stage Regression for Bidder Announcement CAR 
This table reports the Heckman (1979) two-stage regression for bidder announcement CAR. The 
dependent variable of the column (1) is a dummy that takes one if a bidder-financial advisor connection 
exists and zero otherwise. The column (1) is a probit model that predicts the likelihood of the completion 
of a deal. The columns (2) and (3) are OLS regression models. The dependent variables of the columns 
(2) and (3) are the bidder CAR (-2,2) around the announcement date. The Inverse Mills Ratio is derived 
using model (1) and is included in models (2) and (3). Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes 
one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Relative 
Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm 
in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks 
prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups 
is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after 
the announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the 
bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy 
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on 
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the 
market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by 
the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided 
by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the 
cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus 
dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing 
stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that 
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer 
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a 
dummy that takes one if the target firm is a listed company, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor 
Distance is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard 
errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Prob(Connection Exists) CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-2, +2) 
        
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.00476 -0.0285 
  (0.0175) (0.0339) 
Top Financial Advisor Dummy 0.455***  -0.0112 
 (0.133)  (0.0152) 
Relative Deal Size -0.127** -0.00177 0.00371 
 (0.0543) (0.00346) (0.00508) 
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Table 3 Heckman Two-stage Regression for Bidder Announcement CAR (Cont.) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Prob(Connection Exists) CAR (-2, +2) CAR (-2, +2) 
    
Bidder Size 3.87e-06*** -1.16e-07 -1.72e-07* 
 (1.32e-06) (7.18e-08) (9.86e-08) 
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups  -0.000475 -0.00122 
  (0.0112) (0.0116) 
Bidder Stock Return Volatility  0.120 -0.0713 
  (0.482) (0.488) 
Cash Payment Used -0.150 0.0229** 0.0239** 
 (0.167) (0.0101) (0.0105) 
ROA 1.635 0.0264 -0.0233 
 (1.000) (0.0667) (0.0736) 
Tobin's Q -0.125** -0.00249 0.00117 
 (0.0612) (0.00261) (0.00430) 
Leverage 0.272 0.0325 0.0276 
 (0.306) (0.0231) (0.0227) 
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio 0.00735 0.0495 0.0509 
 (0.593) (0.0475) (0.0482) 
Same Industry Deal -0.0278 0.00629 0.00852 
 (0.123) (0.00709) (0.00707) 
Tender Offer  0.00381 0.0137 
  (0.00782) (0.00844) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance  3.78e-07 1.49e-06 
  (4.20e-06) (4.24e-06) 
Target is Public 0.0346  -0.0257*** 
 (0.131)  (0.00860) 
Number of Professional Organizations 0.00183**   
 (0.000925)   
Constant -0.884** -0.0702* -0.0218 
 (0.390) (0.0407) (0.0556) 
    
Industry Dummy N Y Y 
Year Dummy Y Y Y 
    
Observations 675 675 675 
Pseudo R-squared/Adjusted R-squared 0.106 0.067 0.081 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table 4 Switching Regression Model for Bidder Announcement CAR, What-if Analysis, and 
Propensity Score Matching 
Table 4 reports the results of the switching regression model for bidder announcement CAR in Panel A, 
what-if analysis in Panel B, and propensity score matching in Panel C. The dependent variables in Panel 
A are bidder announcement CAR (-2,+2), where columns (1) and (2) are based on the subsample that a 
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection exists, and that columns (3) and (4) are based on the 
subsample that no such connection exists. The Inverse Mills Ratio is derived using model (1) in Table 3. 
Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial 
advisors according to the League Table. Relative Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value 
reported by SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. 
Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the announcement multiply by the 
number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Bidder Stock 
Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the bidding firm from 205 days 
before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy variable that takes one if cash is 
used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on assets of the bidder in the year prior 
to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity (price per share at 
the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total 
liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided by the book value of the total assets. 
Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated 
as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred 
stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end 
prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that takes one if the bidder and the 
target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer is a dummy variable that takes 
one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Target is Public is a dummy that takes one if the target 
firm is a listed company, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance is the direct distance 
between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard errors correcting 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Switching Regression Model for Bidder Announcement CAR 
 Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Connection Exists Connection Exists No Connection No Connection 
          
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.0292 0.0365 0.00289 -0.0651 
 (0.0433) (0.106) (0.0204) (0.0411) 
Top Financial Advisor Dummy  0.0413  -0.0274 
  (0.0468)  (0.0184) 
Relative Deal Size 0.00402 -0.000799 -0.00519 0.00413 
 (0.00792) (0.0114) (0.00381) (0.00572) 
Bidder Size -8.10e-08 1.28e-07 -1.59e-07 -3.19e-07** 
 (1.87e-07) (3.06e-07) (9.75e-08) (1.47e-07) 
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups -0.0358 -0.0290 0.000290 -0.00111 
 (0.0358) (0.0339) (0.0130) (0.0135) 
Bidder Stock Return Volatility 0.126 -0.0615 0.361 0.246 
 (1.335) (1.352) (0.532) (0.534) 
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Table 4 Switching Regression Model for Bidder Announcement CAR, What-if Analysis, and 
Propensity Score Matching (Cont.) 
 Dependent variable = CAR (-2, +2) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Connection Exists Connection Exists No Connection No Connection 
Cash Payment Used 0.0138 -0.00327 0.0229** 0.0284** 
 (0.0228) (0.0263) (0.0116) (0.0126) 
ROA -0.287* -0.129 0.0404 -0.0575 
 (0.157) (0.155) (0.0757) (0.0854) 
Tobin's Q 0.00242 -0.00477 -0.00264 0.00507 
 (0.00742) (0.0156) (0.00302) (0.00508) 
Leverage 0.130 0.145 0.0165 0.00700 
 (0.103) (0.0913) (0.0259) (0.0256) 
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio -0.297*** -0.279*** 0.109* 0.117* 
 (0.0982) (0.0940) (0.0604) (0.0609) 
Same Industry Deal 0.0453*** 0.0397*** -0.00296 0.000471 
 (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.00845) (0.00840) 
Tender Offer 0.0239 0.0396* 0.00234 0.0112 
 (0.0183) (0.0207) (0.00937) (0.0102) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance 6.60e-06 1.08e-05 -2.16e-06 -1.22e-06 
 (1.38e-05) (1.43e-05) (4.85e-06) (4.86e-06) 
Target is Public  -0.0456*  -0.0234** 
  (0.0231)  (0.00958) 
Constant -0.0349 -0.120 -0.0506 0.0387 
 (0.0999) (0.165) (0.0482) (0.0660) 
     
Industry Dummy Y Y Y Y 
Year Dummy Y Y Y Y 
     
Observations 142 142 533 533 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196 0.251 0.065 0.078 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Panel B: What-if Analysis 
 Connection Exists No Connection 
Actual CAR (1) -1.043% 0.331% 
Hypothetical CAR (2) 0.311% -2.779% 
Improvement ((1) – (2)) 1.354%** -3.109%*** 
N  142 533 
Panel C: Propensity Score Matching Analysis 
 Subsample that Connection Exists (1) Matched Sample without Connection (2) 
Actual CAR -1.043% 0.536% 
(1) – (2) -1.579%**  
N 142 142 
 
We show that the inverse Mills ratios are still insignificant in all subsample models presented in Panel 
A. We then compute the hypothetical CAR of those samples with bidder-bidder financial advisor 
connection by applying the coefficients of the “no connection” model to the actual data of the “connection 
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exists” samples. Similarly, we compute the hypothetical CAR of those samples without bidder-bidder 
financial advisor connection by applying the coefficients of the “connection exists” model to the actual 
data of the “no connection” samples. The comparison between the actual CAR and the hypothetical CAR, 
as a what-if analysis using the models (2) and (4) in the Panel A of Table 4, is presented in the Panel B of 
Table 421. We show that those M&A deals with connections between the bidder and bidder financial 
advisor would have improve the announcement CAR by 1.35%, if there is no such connection exists. On 
the other hand, the M&A deals announced without a bidder-bidder financial advisor connection would 
have been worsened by 3.11% in terms of the announcement CAR had they chosen a connected financial 
advisor. Both numbers are statistically and economically significant, given an average (median) CAR of 
0.04% (-0.35%). 
Furthermore, we implement the propensity score matching technique proposed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) to match each M&A deal that involves a connected financial advisor with one that does not 
by the closest probability of involving a connected financial advisor. The probability of involving a 
connected financial advisor is estimated using the same probit model presented in Table 3 column (1). We 
then compare the actual CAR of the subsample that a connection exists with the actual CAR of the 
matched sample without connections. The results are shown in Table 4 Panel C. We show that the CAR 
of the “connection exists” sample is 1.58% lower than that of the matched sample. The difference is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Overall, we present evidence showing that involving a financial advisor whose top executive leaders 
have prior employment connections with those of the bidder has a significant negative impact on the 
bidder CAR, and that such impact is statistically and economically meaningful, which is unlikely to be 
caused by self-selection bias. 
                                                          
21 The comparison using the models in column (1) and (3) of Table 4 Panel A yields similar magnitudes and 
significance. 
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3.3 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Completion 
We then investigate if the connection between bidder and bidder advisor helps the bidder to score a 
higher odd of complete the deal. Particularly, using a probit model, we estimate the probability of a deal 
completion on the connection between bidder and bidder advisor, bidder characteristics, and deal 
characteristics. We construct the model following Golubov et al. (2012) and El-Khatib et al. (2015), and 
the results are shown in Table 5. Consistent with prior literature, high profitability, growth opportunity 
and low leverage bidders are more likely to complete the deal. In model (1), we show that bidder-bidder 
financial advisor connections has a positive impact on the likelihood of completing a deal, and that deal 
size to total assets ratio also has a positive impact, which is different from Golubov et al. (2012). Hence, 
we add an interaction term between bidder-bidder advisor connection and the deal size to total assets ratio 
in model (2). The coefficient shows a significant negative impact of the interaction term22. These results 
indicate that while a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor may positively impact the 
likelihood of a deal completion, such impact is reduced, when the deal is relatively larger and thus more 
important to the bidder, or the bidder is a larger firm. This is consistent with the reputation effect of the 
social network argued by Jandik et al. (2016) that as the M&A deal becomes more noticeable, the 
influence of the personal connection between the bidder and their financial advisor on the deal, especially 
when a deal may more likely to be value destroying as we find in the previous section, is diminished. 
  
                                                          
22 We obtain similar results of negative impact of the interaction term when interacting the deal size to total assets 
with the bidder size. 
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Table 5 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Completion 
Table 5 reports the result of the probit model that predicts the likelihood of a deal completion. The 
dependent variables are the dummy variables that take one if a deal is eventually effective as recorded by 
SDC, and zero otherwise. Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection is a dummy variable that takes one if an 
employment-based personal connection between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board 
exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Deal Size to Total Assets is the deal value reported by 
SDC divided by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Top Advisor 
Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors 
according to the League Table. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the 
announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the 
bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy 
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on 
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the 
market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by 
the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided 
by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the 
cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus 
dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing 
stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that 
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer 
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder-bidder Advisor 
Distance is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard 
errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent variable = Prob (Deal Completion) (1) (2) 
      
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection 0.323* 0.648*** 
 (0.179) (0.218) 
Deal Size to Total Assets 0.00205* 0.00223* 
 (0.00121) (0.00130) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection* Deal Size to Total Assets  -0.760*** 
  (0.283) 
Top Advisor Hired 0.00685 0.0254 
 (0.149) (0.151) 
Bidder Size -3.06e-06** -3.31e-06*** 
 (1.20e-06) (1.22e-06) 
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups 0.0838 0.0799 
 (0.133) (0.131) 
Bidder Stock Return Volatility 3.526 4.732 
 (6.800) (7.014) 
Cash Payment Used 0.307 0.300 
 (0.187) (0.187) 
ROA 2.323*** 2.419*** 
 (0.848) (0.867) 
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Table 5 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Completion (Cont.) 
 Dependent variable = Prob (Deal Completion) (1) (2) 
      
Tobin's Q 0.0695 0.0694 
 (0.0433) (0.0426) 
Leverage -0.355 -0.344 
 (0.388) (0.393) 
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio -0.485 -0.430 
 (0.735) (0.755) 
Same Industry Deal 0.115 0.150 
 (0.139) (0.141) 
Tender Offer -0.185 -0.199 
 (0.186) (0.189) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance -8.14e-05 -9.09e-05 
 (8.30e-05) (8.38e-05) 
Constant 0.819* 0.744* 
 (0.431) (0.440) 
   
Industry Dummy N N 
Year Dummy Y Y 
   
Observations 675 675 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0901 0.101 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
3.4 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Deal Resolution Time 
In this section, we examine whether a connection between the bidder and bidder advisor may shorten 
or lengthen the time from deal announcement to deal being effective. We are interested in this question 
because if a connection between the bidder and bidder financial advisor may facilitate the information 
transmission, a deal should be resolved faster, exhibiting a high efficiency of the deal execution. Golubov 
et al. (2012) argue that a shorter time between the deal announcement and deal resolution indicates the 
“skill effect” of a reputable financial advisor. In fact, they find that deals worked by reputable financial 
advisors indeed take a shorter time to resolve, consistent with their expected skill and efficiency. 
Therefore, we control for the top financial advisor in our analysis.  Officer et al. (2009) argue that the 
resolution time for M&A deals is less important to consider when target is a private firm because private 
target deals are typically announced when done. Therefore, we only use the observations where the target 
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firm is a public firm and the deal is finally completed in this analysis. The results of the OLS estimation is 
reported in Table 6. 
Table 6 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Time to Resolution 
This table reports the OLS regression of the time to resolution on bidder-bidder advisor connection and 
other control variables. The dependent variables are the natural logarithm of number of days from the 
announcement day to the day that the deal is effective as reported by SDC database. Bidder-bidder 
Advisor Connection is a dummy variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection 
between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder 
financial advisor. Relative Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value reported by SDC divided 
by the total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy 
variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to the 
League Table. Bidder Size is the stock price of the bidding firm 4 weeks prior to the announcement 
multiply by the number of shares outstanding. Bidder Market Adjusted Runups is the market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. 
Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock return of the bidding firm from 
205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy variable that takes 
one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on assets of the bidder in 
the year prior to the announcement. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the sum of the market value of equity 
(price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement multiply by the number of shares 
outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, all divided by the book value of 
the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity Ratio is the cash flows-to-equity 
ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends on common 
and preferred stock divided by the number of shares outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal 
year-end prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that takes one if the bidder 
and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer is a dummy variable 
that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance is the direct 
distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust standard errors correcting 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable = Ln(Days to Resolution) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.168*** 
 (0.0705) (0.0711) (0.0615) 
Top Advisor Hired  -0.00432 -0.0730 
  (0.0628) (0.0594) 
Relative Deal Size   0.143*** 
   (0.0297) 
Bidder Size   2.79e-06*** 
   (5.67e-07) 
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups   0.0229 
   (0.0766) 
Bidder Stock Return Volatility   -1.178 
   (3.901) 
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Table 6 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Time to Resolution (Cont.) 
 Dependent Variable = Ln(Days to Resolution) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Cash Payment Used   -0.0205 
   (0.0654) 
ROA   0.280 
   (0.367) 
Tobin's Q   -0.00992 
   (0.0184) 
Leverage   0.220 
   (0.153) 
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio   -0.0213 
   (0.277) 
Same Industry Deal   0.105** 
   (0.0526) 
Tender Offer   -0.544*** 
   (0.0657) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance   -2.50e-05 
   (2.83e-05) 
Constant 4.593*** 4.595*** 4.386*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0519) (0.176) 
    
Industry Dummy N N N 
Year Dummy Y Y Y 
    
Observations 406 406 406 
Adjusted R-squared 0.015 0.013 0.341 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
The dependent variable is log of resolution days between announcement and taking into effect. 
Column (1) of Table 6 reports the unconditional impact of bidder-bidder advisor connection on resolution 
time and shows that a connection is associated with a longer time to resolution. In column (2), we add 
control for top financial advisors, and in column (3) additional controls for firm and deal characteristics. 
We show that the connection between bidder and bidder advisor is consistently positively significant. The 
coefficient of top advisor is negative, which is consistent with Golubov et al. (2012), but not significant. 
Based on the model in column (3), we find that all else equal, a deal will take 16.8% longer time to 
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resolve, if a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor exists23, which is both statistically 
and economically significant. Overall, we find evidence showing that the deals advised by financial 
advisor with personal connections to the bidder take a longer time to resolve, controlling for advisor 
reputation, firm and deal characteristics. This implies that instead of utilizing the better information 
transmission benefited from personal connections, those connected financial advisors work inefficiently 
in those M&A deals in terms of the time to resolution. 
3.5 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection, Advisor Fees, and CEO Bonus 
Given the results discussed above, we have shown that a personal connection between the bidder and 
their financial advisor is detrimental. It causes value loss to the shareholder at the M&A deal 
announcement, takes longer time to resolve, but has a higher likelihood to complete. It is therefore 
interesting to examine the motivation behind that, and study how the both sides of the connection benefit 
from the deal. Hence, we investigate whether the financial advisors are paid more fees, and the bidder 
CEOs are paid more bonus because of the personal connection between bidder and bidder financial 
advisor.  
Corporates pay substantial amount of fees to their advisors, but such fees are not required by SEC to 
be disclosed in a M&A deals. As a result, we present the OLS regression model that estimates the advisor 
fees based on the 265 deals for which the advisor fee information is available in SDC database and 
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection information is available in BoardEx database. Table 7 shows 
the results. Model (1) shows the unconditional regression of log of advisor fees on the connection 
between bidder and their financial advisor. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant. In 
Model (2), we add a control variable for top advisors, which has a positive and significant coefficient, 
consistent with Golubov et al. (2012). The coefficient of bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is still 
positively significant. In Model (3), on top of the bidder-bidder financial advisor connection and top 
                                                          
23 In unreported results, we find that all else equal, a deal takes 18.1 more days to resolve if there is a connection 
between bidder and bidder financial advisor, compared to one that with no such connection exists. 
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advisors, we control for firm and deal characteristics that will affect advisor fees following prior 
literature. The bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is still positive and statistically significant. Our 
results are also economically significant. Controlling for deal and firm characteristics, the financial 
advisors with personal connection to the bidder are paid 57.6% higher than those without a personal 
connection, which is substantial, considering the median payment to the advisor in our sample being 8 
million U.S. dollars24. 
Table 7 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Advisor Fees 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder financial advisor fees on the bidder-
financial advisor connection and other control variables. The dependent variables are the natural 
logarithm of advisor fees paid to bidder financial advisor as reported by SDC database. Bidder-bidder 
Advisor Connection is a dummy variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection 
between the CEO, CFO, COO, President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder 
financial advisor. Top Advisor Hired is a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of 
the top 8 financial advisors according to the League Table. Deal size is the deal value recorded by SDC 
database. Relative Deal Size is the natural logarithm of the deal value reported by SDC divided by the 
total assets of the firm in the year prior to the M&A announcement. Cash Payment Used is a dummy 
variable that takes one if cash is used as a payment in the deal, and 0 otherwise. ROA is the return on 
assets of the bidder in the year prior to the announcement. Same Industry Deal is a dummy variable that 
takes one if the bidder and the target are in the same industry based on two-digit SIC code. Tender Offer 
is a dummy variable that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder Market Adjusted 
Runups is the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return of the bidding firm stock from 205 days before to 6 
days after the announcement. Bidder Stock Return Volatility is the standard deviation of the daily stock 
return of the bidding firm from 205 days before to 6 days after the announcement. Distance between 
Bidder and Advisor is the direct distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Robust 
standard errors correcting heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable = ln(Advisor Fees) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection 1.224*** 0.922*** 0.576** 
 (0.184) (0.183) (0.287) 
Top Financial Advisor Dummy  1.508*** 0.957*** 
  (0.165) (0.295) 
Deal Size   1.96e-05** 
   (8.10e-06) 
Relative Deal Size   0.271** 
   (0.104) 
                                                          
24 In unreported analysis, using raw advisor fees as dependent variable, and find that the financial advisors with 
personal connections to the bidder are, on average, paid 10.3 million dollars more than those without personal 
connections, controlling for deal and firm financial characteristics. 
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Table 7 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and Advisor Fees (Cont.) 
 Dependent Variable = ln(Advisor Fees) (1) (2) (3) 
        
Cash Payment Used   -0.0213 
   (0.262) 
Same Industry Deal   0.0263 
   (0.244) 
Tender Offer   -0.174 
   (0.616) 
Bidder Market Adjusted Runups   -0.259 
   (0.277) 
Bidder Stock Return Volatility   -28.67** 
   (10.97) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance   1.00e-05 
   (0.000122) 
Constant 8.523*** 7.667*** 7.513*** 
 (0.102) (0.142) (0.581) 
    
Observations 265 265 121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.086 0.319 0.396 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
CEOs usually get cash bonus as a monetary incentive following a successful M&A deal (Grinstein & 
Hribar 2004). We follow Ishii and Xuan (2014) and therefore focus on the cash bonus that the CEOs of 
the bidding firm receive in the year that the M&A deal completes. Using the 350 M&A deals that finally 
complete and report a non-zero CEO bonus in the deal completion year, we implement OLS regression of 
the log of CEO cash bonus on the connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Unlike in 
previous analysis where firm financials are lagged one year, we use the same year firm financial 
characteristics in this analysis. The OLS regression results are shown in Table 8. We show the 
unconditional model in column (1) and control for the top financial advisor in model (2), where the 
bidder-bidder financial advisor connection is positive and highly significant in both models. In model (3) 
we add additional deal and firm financial characteristics, and in model (4) we add the stock return and 
volatility. The results show that the bidder-bidder advisor connection is consistently positive and 
significant in predicting CEO bonus. High stock return, larger firms, low stock volatility are also 
associated with higher CEO bonus, which is consistent with prior literature. Our results are economically 
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significant as well. The CEOs in the firms where executive leaderships have personal connections to the 
financial advisors get paid 41.4% more in cash bonus, on average, in the acquisition completion year than 
those in the firms without such personal connections25.  
Table 8 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and CEO Bonus 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of CEO bonus on the bidder-bidder financial advisor 
connection and other control variables. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the bidding 
firm’s CEO cash bonus in the year the deal is complete. Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection is a dummy 
variable that takes one if an employment-based personal connection between the CEO, CFO, COO, 
President and Chair of the Board exists between bidder and bidder financial advisor. Top Advisor Hired is 
a dummy variable that takes one if the financial advisor is one of the top 8 financial advisors according to 
the League Table. Total assets is the book value of total assets of the firm. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the 
sum of the market value of equity (price per share at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement 
multiply by the number of shares outstanding), total liability, and the liquidating value of preferred stock, 
all divided by the book value of the total assets. Leverage is the debt to asset ratio. Cash Flow to Equity 
Ratio is the cash flows-to-equity ratio calculated as the Income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation minus dividends on common and preferred stock divided by the number of shares 
outstanding times the closing stock price at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement. All firm 
financial data are at the end of the fiscal year that the deal completes. Tender Offer is a dummy variable 
that takes one if the offer is a tender offer reported by SDC. Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance is the direct 
distance between the headquarters of the bidder and their advisor. Annual Stock Return is the buy-and-
hold stock return of the firm in the current fiscal year. Stock Return volatility is the standard deviation of 
the daily stock return of the firm in the current fiscal year. Robust standard errors correcting 
heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Dependent Variable = ln(CEO Cash 
Bonus) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection 0.887*** 0.877*** 0.476** 0.414* 
 (0.199) (0.202) (0.222) (0.218) 
Top Financial Advisor Dummy  0.0731 0.138 0.00773 
  (0.159) (0.178) (0.177) 
Total Assets   2.28e-06*** 4.53e-06*** 
   (4.85e-07) (1.26e-06) 
Tobin’s Q   0.0393 0.0339 
   (0.0369) (0.0358) 
Leverage   0.489 -0.422 
   (0.498) (0.543) 
Cash Flow to Equity Ratio   0.187 -0.264 
   (0.966) (0.768) 
  
                                                          
25 In unreported analysis using raw cash bonus as dependent variable, we find that CEO cash bonus is 0.89 million 
dollars higher when the deal involves a personally connected financial advisor, controlling for firm financial and 
deal characteristics. 
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Table 8 Bidder-bidder Advisor Connection and CEO Bonus (Cont.) 
 Dependent Variable = ln(CEO Cash 
Bonus) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Tender Offer   0.347* 0.364** 
   (0.192) (0.173) 
Bidder-bidder Advisor Distance   -5.19e-05 0.000144 
   (0.000117) (0.000102) 
Annual Stock Return    0.486** 
    (0.236) 
Stock Return Volatility    -59.66*** 
    (10.72) 
Constant 6.586*** 6.548*** 6.418*** 8.527*** 
 (0.0884) (0.103) (0.268) (0.473) 
     
Industry Dummy N N N N 
Year Dummy N N Y Y 
     
Observations 350 350 304 264 
Adjusted R-squared 0.053 0.051 0.160 0.312 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Admittedly, due to the data availability, we are unable to observe the complete picture of financial 
advisor fees and the CEO cash bonus compensation. Nevertheless, based on the observable samples, we 
show evidence that the financial advisor and the CEO of the bidding firm get higher benefit in the forms 
of advisor fees and cash bonus, respectively, following a M&A deal when there are personal connections 
between the bidder and bidder financial advisor. This evidence sheds light on the motivation of those 
M&A deals carried out by connected bidders and their advisors. They are possibly utilizing the personal 
connections to collude and benefit each other at the expenses of the shareholders. 
3.6 Additional Robustness Checks 
One possible concern regarding the results of our analysis is that it may be the geographical distance 
between the bidder and bidder advisor, instead of the personal connection between the two firms, that 
affects the outcome of the M&A deal, as geographically closer bidder and financial advisors have a better 
chance to transmit information. Therefore, we control for the geographical distance between bidder and 
bidder financial advisor in all of our analysis. Our results are robust with these controls. Second, we 
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control for the reputation effects by including a dummy indicating whether the financial advisor is one of 
the top 8 financial advisors ranked by the SDC League Table. Additionally, in unreported analysis, we 
add the interaction between the bidder-bidder financial advisor connection and the top financial advisor as 
an additional variable. Our results do not change, and the interaction effect is not significant. Third, in 
unreported analysis, we control for whether the target hires a financial advisor, and whether the target has 
a connection to their financial advisor. Our results still hold with these controls. Forth, we use an 
alternative measure, social capital index, which uses principle component analysis to measure the social 
capital intensity of an area considering all business and nonbusiness associations, as a determinant to 
estimate the likelihood of a connection between bidder and bidder financial advisor exists. Our results still 
hold. Additionally, we obtain similar results if using different time window to estimate the CAR, or if 
using different measure for bidder size. 
4. Conclusion 
The financial advisors have been playing a crucial rule in M&A deals, which are some of the most 
decisions a company makes. We extend the literature in understanding the rules and impact of a chosen 
financial advisor could have on the outcome of M&A deals and extend the understand of the social 
networks in finance. Using a sample of 675 M&A deals from 2000 to 2016 and the BoardEx database 
recording the personal work-related connections of millions of corporate decision makers in the world, we 
show that the existence of a connection between the top executives of the bidder and those of their 
financial advisors causes a lower announcement CAR. Such impact is not a result of the endogenous 
determinants of which financial advisor to hire. Using a Heckman two-stage procedure and switching 
regression with endogenous switches, we show that a typical M&A deal with personal connections 
between bidder and financial advisor could have had a 1.35% higher CAR if it was a deal without such 
connection exists. We also show that M&A deals advised by financial advisors that are personally 
connected to the bidder are more likely to complete, but it takes a longer time to resolve than deals 
without such connections. Our evidence indicates the detrimental effects of the personal connections 
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between bidder and bidder financial advisors. We also investigate the motivation behind such behavior 
and phenomenon and find that the financial advisors are paid more fees for the advising services and the 
CEOs of the bidder companies are paid a higher cash bonus following a successful merger. These 
evidences imply that the both sides of the connection are pursuing personal interests at the expenses of 
shareholders in terms of a value loss at the announcement and less efficient and timely in processing the 
deal. 
Our paper has several contributions to the literature. We extend the literature of social ties in finance 
and show the economic value of such connections. We are the first to investigate the impact of personal 
social ties between bidder and financial advisor under the context of M&A. We extend the literature in the 
financial advisor and M&A performance by showing that such social ties as bidder-bidder financial 
advisor are more detrimental than beneficial and diminishes the certification role of the financial advisors. 
Last but not the least, we offer insights about how financial market perceives such personal connections 
between bidder and bidder financial advisor and show that these connections are perceived negatively by 
the market upon the announcement of the M&A deal. 
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Chapter 3 
Wealth Inequality, Leveraged Bubbles, and the Joneses Effect 
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1. Introduction 
In recent decades, asset bubbles have become more frequent in the wealthiest nations.  Jorda, Schularick, 
& Taylor (2015) document 139 equity and housing bubbles across 17 countries between 1870 and 2013, 97 
(70%) of which occurred in the post-WWII era.  They show that leveraged bubbles—those where assets 
such as real estate are financed by a high proportion of debt—often accompany financial crises and are 
especially damaging to economies when the bubbles burst. 
Income and wealth inequality have also increased significantly over the last several decades.  Using 
data primarily from the Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, Wolff (2016) shows that between 
1962 and 2014, the share of income and wealth held by the top 5% of U.S. households increased 10 and 17 
percentage points, respectively.  Saez and Zucman (2016) use more detailed tax records to assess wealth at 
the very top of the distribution.  They find that U.S. wealth concentration among the top 0.1% of families 
increased dramatically from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012, making wealth inequality is comparable to that of 
the early 20th century.  In contrast, the wealth share of the bottom 90% of taxpayers plummeted since the 
mid-1980s mainly because middle-class savings plummeted.  (Saez and Zucman, 2016)  At the same time, 
the debt burdens of middle class households increased dramatically.  The mean debt to income ratio of the 
middle three quartiles of households increased from 67% to 125% between 1983 and 2013, while the mean 
debt to net worth ratio increased from 37% to 64%.  (Wolff, 2016) 
Researchers have begun to explore theoretical and empirical connections between inequality and the 
build-up of leveraged bubbles.  Rajan (2010) argues that wealth inequality was an underlying cause of the 
recent subprime financial crisis because low- and middle-income households increasingly accumulated debt 
to maintain or increase consumption, which left them prone to over-indebtedness and default on credit cards, 
housing, and auto loans.   
An important question is why households felt the need to maintain or increase consumption beyond 
their earnings.  In a survey of the literature connecting income inequality and financial crises, van Treeck 
(2014) distinguishes credit supply effects from credit demand effects.  The credit supply story is that 
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growing wealth inequality facilitated easy access to credit to low-income households.  Rajan (2010) argues 
that government programs such as tax credits and Government Sponsored Enterprise housing affordability 
goals postpone the political pressure on the government to address the financial stress felt by most 
households.  Kumhof et al. (2015) develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in 
which a crisis is driven by a permanent shift in income inequality because top earners use a large share of 
their higher income to accumulate financial wealth in the form of loans to bottom earners, who eventually 
default as relief from the high debt load outweighs the costs from default.  Demarzo et al. (2008) present 
an overlapping generations model where agents' utilities depend on the wealth of their cohort, which 
induces relative wealth concerns.  To avoid a relatively low-wealth outcome, agents herd into risky 
securities, which drives down their expected return. Even though the bubble is likely to burst and lead to a 
substantial loss, agents' relative wealth concerns make them afraid to trade against the crowd. With each of 
these explanations, the political or financial system endogenously facilitates the credit transfer to meet the 
desire of the wealthy to increase saving.   
On the credit demand side, the neoclassical permanent consumption hypothesis could potentially 
explain the increase in household credit because it allows for intertemporal consumption smoothing for 
transitory, but only for transitory income shocks. The empirical evidence, however, shows that the decline 
in income for many households was permanent; the variance of transitory earnings declined or remained 
constant after the 1980s, providing little incentive for households to increase borrowing thereafter.  (van 
Treeck, 2014)  Alternatively, the relative income hypothesis states that a household’s saving rate is an 
increasing function of (i) the household’s position in the income distribution within its local reference group 
and (ii) the relation of the household’s current to past income.  (van Treeck, 2014)   The first condition is 
the “keeping up with the Joneses” effect because the desire to consume increases with the household’s 
perception of relative status in its local group.  The second condition is consistent with habit persistence 
and the anchoring bias where an individual uses an incomplete reference point (e.g. last year’s income) to 
make decisions about future consumption.  The surge in income and wealth among the top 0.1% of 
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taxpayers can lead to ‘expenditure cascades’ all the way down the income ladder if individuals are 
influenced by the spending patterns of others just above them in the income distribution (Frank et al., 2010). 
In addition, evidence from SCF shows that all households except the top 10% have become more strongly 
indebted since the late 1980s.   
In sum, wealth inequality may facilitate leveraged bubbles if it leads to status-driven, debt-financed 
asset purchases by low- and middle-income households.  These conditions plausibly existed in the U.S. 
during the subprime housing boom between 2000 and 2006.  As home prices began to rise briskly, many 
households viewed a home purchase as a good investment because the momentum model suggested that 
homes would continue to appreciate.  The benefits to homeownership spread by “psychological contagion” 
(Shiller, 2002) among friends, family, and neighbors.  Households sought to improve their social status by 
becoming first-time homeowners, upscaling to more expensive homes, or tapping their home equity to 
purchase other durables.  Financial intermediaries facilitated the credit demand through large-scale 
subprime securitization.  (Mian and Sufi, 2009; Nadauld and Sherlund, 2013).  The combination of these 
factors surely contributed to the financial crisis and Great Recession.  
In this paper, we examine the effects of wealth inequality and social status on asset bubbles in an 
experimental lab setting.  The treatments that we impose on traders mimic, to some degree, incentives that 
many households faced in deciding whether to purchase or refinance a house during the housing boom.  To 
our knowledge, we are the first to use an experimental methodology to study the effect of wealth inequality, 
and the joint effects of inequality, leverage, and status on asset bubbles.  Our experimental design is 
modeled after Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988; hereafter, SSW) and proceeds in three stages.  Each 
stage consists of six sessions with a base group of six inexperienced traders with equal initial endowments, 
and a similar treatment group with unequal endowments where three randomly chosen traders are “rich” 
and three are “poor.”  The aggregate endowments of the equal and unequal sessions are always identical.  
The second and third stages introduce leverage and status, respectively, in addition to unequal endowments. 
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The first stage examines the effect of equal versus unequal initial endowments.  Experimental 
researchers have shown that momentum trading models explain asset price paths quite well.  (Caginalp et 
al., 2000a; Caginalp et al., 2000b)  Traders with unequal endowments, however, may produce different 
momentum dynamics than traders with equal endowments.  On the one hand, the concentrated liquidity 
among the rich traders may lead to greater momentum effects if they primarily trade with one another.  On 
the other hand, poor traders are less able to contribute to an emerging bubble because they are liquidity 
constrained.  The ultimate outcome may depend on the cognitive skills and degree of risk aversion of the 
rich and poor traders. 
The second stage introduces leverage where traders in both the equal and unequal endowment sessions 
can borrow interest-free from the experimenter up to 75% of the market value of their asset holdings.  This 
condition simulates the high leverage of home financing.  Experimental research has convincingly shown 
that bubbles increase with liquidity in the market.  The ability to purchase assets on margin, higher cash to 
asset ratios for a given endowment, and an absolute increase in cash all lead to greater bubbles.  (King et 
al., 1993; Caginalp et al.; Haruvy and Noussair, 2006)  In the treatment group, we expect the poor to borrow 
more than the rich to facilitate asset purchases, which should ease the liquidity constraints on momentum.  
Relative to the first stage, we expect higher asset price paths in both the equal and unequal sessions due to 
the ability of traders to buy on margin. 
The third stage retains leverage and adds the Joneses effect.  After the 1st and 3rd periods of the 15-
period session, the trader(s) with the greatest number of asset shares stands and is recognized with applause 
by the other traders.  Traders learn early in the session that there is a status for holding a high number of 
shares, even though accumulating more shares may not be financially rewarding if the price is above 
fundamental value.  We expect that the status incentive encourages traders, especially the poor traders, to 
borrow to purchase assets, which increases price momentum and inflates the bubble.  Schoenberg and 
Haruvy (2012) are the first to introduce social effects in a manner similar to ours.  After each period, all 
traders observe either the highest account total (cash plus the market value of shares) of the leader, or the 
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lowest account total of the laggard.  They find that average asset prices are higher in sessions where traders 
are informed of the highest account total, and lower when traders are informed of the lowest account total.  
Further, they survey trader satisfaction and find that satisfaction ratings increase for the trader that is the 
leader, decrease for the trader that is the laggard, and are lower for non-leaders when given the highest 
account total than for non-laggards when given the lowest account total.  These results are consistent with 
the notion that relative status is an important part of traders’ utility functions.  
Our Stage 1 results show that the unequally endowed sessions are more likely to experience both 
underpricing and overpricing relative to the equally endowed sessions.  This result is consistent with a 
momentum effect that is either dampened from liquidity constraints by poor traders or enhanced from the 
concentrated liquidity among the rich traders.  When leverage is added in Stage 2, we find consistent 
underpricing in the unequal sessions and lower average prices, again consistent with dampened momentum 
effects.  Poor traders do not take advantage of the ability to borrow interest-free from the experimenter.  
The results from Stage 3 with the Joneses effect added are strikingly different.  They show that the unequal 
sessions experience higher amplitude, relative deviation, and average prices than the equal sessions.  In 
addition, poor traders are much more active in the early periods than they are in the other stages. 
In sum, we observe that unequal initial endowments and the presence of a Joneses effect lead to 
substantial overpricing as compared to situations where one or both factors is absent.  The bubble is driven 
in part by stronger demand for the asset and more aggressive borrowing by the low-wealth traders.  To the 
extent that these results transfer to real economies, they show that wealth inequality and access to credit 
facilitate formation of a leveraged bubble, but the bubble may not emerge until psychological contagion is 
sufficiently strong so that holding the asset becomes an important status benchmark. 
2. Experimental Design 
This section describes our experimental design, including participant recruiting and the structure of 
each session.  It describes the assets that participants traded, the three stages of the experiment, and the 
post-session assessment. 
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2.1 Recruiting and Session Structure 
We generally follow and build upon the classic 15-period asset market experiment of SSW.  We 
conducted a total of 37 sessions at the Behavioral Business Research Lab at the University of Arkansas 
from April 2016 to September 2017. Each session included 6 participants (traders) recruited from a pool of 
undergraduate students across all majors at the University of Arkansas, though the bulk of the participants 
were business and economics majors.  Traders could not have participated in a similar asset market 
experiment, nor could they repeat participation in this experiment.  Traders were randomly seated in 
cubicles in a computer laboratory, so they could not observe other traders’ screens.  They did, however, 
have an unobstructed view of the experimenter.  They were not allowed to communicate with each other, 
nor were they allowed to use personal electronic devices.  
Each session began with an introduction that included time to read the printed instructions. The 
experimenter then read aloud the first two pages of instructions, which contain the most important 
information. Traders could raise their hands with questions, and the experimenter answered questions 
individually.  Two practice periods were run for participants to familiarize themselves with the trading 
interface.  A quiz followed to test the participants’ understanding, and the experimenter individually 
checked the answers of each trader, followed by a brief explanation of all the questions to the traders.  The 
15 trading periods then started.  In each period, traders had 2 minutes and 15 seconds to buy or sell shares 
unless the trade violated leverage constraints or the no-shorting constraint.  At the end of each session, 
traders completed personal assessment information.   
Sessions lasted approximately 90 minutes, and traders were paid a $7 show-up fee with additional 
payments linked to cash held at the end of trading, a coin-flipping lottery based on risk preference responses, 
and the score from a cognitive test. Traders earned an average of $21.61 from the experiment.   
2.2 Assets and Trading 
Assets, which we call shares, are modeled as in SSW.  Shares have a finite life of 15 periods and become 
worthless at the end of the session.  The expected value of a share declines from 360 to 0 through the 15 
 79 
 
periods.  At the end of each period, one of four randomly drawn dividends, which are 0, 8, 28, or 60, is paid 
to the share’s holder. The sequence of the 15 dividends is preset by the experimenter, fixed for all sessions, 
and unknown to traders. 
2.3  Baseline Conditions 
We run three stages of the experiment to observe the cumulative effects from (1) endowment inequality; 
(2) leverage; and (3) the “Joneses Effect.”  The baseline conditions described in this section apply to all 
stages. 
In each stage, we run six 26  sessions where the benchmark group of traders receive equal initial 
endowments, and six sessions where traders receive initial unequal endowments.  In the unequal 
endowment sessions, three randomly chosen traders are “rich,” and three are “poor.”  The aggregate 
endowments are the same across the equal and unequal sessions; only the distribution differs.  At the end 
of a session, traders receive payments in U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of 400 lab cash to $1 dollar. 
Prior to the start of the session, we inform the traders as to whether the endowment distribution is equal 
or unequal.  In the unequal sessions, traders are privately and individually informed whether their 
endowment type is “high” or “low,” and that half of the subjects have high endowments, and the other half 
have low endowments.  They are unaware, however, of the exact endowment of the opposite trader type. 
2.4  Stage 1 
In Stage 1, the benchmark sessions have equal endowments while the treatment sessions have unequal 
endowments.  No borrowing is allowed and no Joneses effect is present.  Traders are endowed in the equal 
sessions with 2160 laboratory (lab) cash and 6 shares. In the unequal sessions, three randomly chosen “rich” 
traders receive 3240 lab cash and 9 shares; the three “poor” traders are endowed with 1080 lab cash and 3 
shares.   
  
                                                          
26 We ran seven sessions with equal endowment in the first stage. 
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2.5  Stage 2 
Stage 2 introduces leverage by allowing traders to borrow at a zero-interest rate up to 75% of the current 
market value of their shareholdings, which is determined by the most recent trading price. Each trader 
receives an additional $5 beyond the show-up fee as a cushion for bankruptcy.  Traders with negative ending 
cash balances at the end of the session forfeit a portion of the cushion up to the maximum of $5.  Again, 
there are two session types.  In the equal endowment sessions, each trader is endowed with 360 lab cash 
and 6 shares.  In the treatment sessions, three randomly chosen rich traders are endowed with 540 lab cash 
and 9 shares, and three poor traders are endowed with 180 cash and 3 shares. For Stages 2 and 3, we 
significantly reduce the initial cash endowment from Stage 1 to induce borrowing.  Consequently, we are 
unable to compare bubbl3e outcome levels between Stage 1 and the other two stages, but stages 2 and 3 are 
directly comparable.  
2.6 Stage 3 
Stage 3 introduces the Joneses Effect.  At the end of period 1, with no previous notice, the experimenter 
enters the room and says “I would like to recognize the person or persons holding the highest number of 
shares in the market.  Look at your computer screen.  If you hold the number of shares that is equal to the 
highest number of shares held in your market, please stand up.  Let’s all give them a round of applause.”  
After applause, experimenter says:  “You can sit now.  We will recognize the people with the highest 
number of shares one more time after period 3.”  The experimenter repeats the statement at the end of period 
3; no recognitions are performed thereafter.  Although traders can see the person that stands up for 
recognition, they cannot identity that trader in the computer simulation.  Additionally, from period 2 until 
the end of the session, a real-time display constantly appears on each trader’s screen with the number of 
shares held by the person with the most shares in the market. 
2.4 Market Setting 
As in SSW, traders trade in a continuous double-auction market. The open orders and transacted orders 
are visible to the traders in the real time, along with a graphical representation of transaction prices. Each 
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trader’s cash balance and number of shares, as well as the most recent trading price are constantly displayed 
on his/her individual screen. In stages 2 and 3, the trader’s current maximum borrowing limit is also 
displayed. At the end of each period, the screen shows the current dividend drawn and the updated balance 
information to the traders. There are 15 periods in each session, and traders have 2 minutes and 15 seconds 
to trade per session.  Dividends are added to cash balances, which, along with shares, carry over to 
subsequent periods. 
2.5 Trader Characteristics 
Immediately after a session is concluded, traders complete a computerized questionnaire, which collects 
demographic information and assesses risk preference and cognitive ability.  Demographic questions collect 
information about the traders’ gender, age, year in college, and major. 
Each trader is asked to choose one of six lotteries, similar to the lotteries used by Eckel and Grossman 
(2002), to elicit risk preference. The experimenter conducts the chosen lottery, privately and individually, 
just before the trader receives cash payment, which includes any payment from the lottery outcome.  Given 
that the lottery question does not distinguish degrees of risk-seeking behavior (Charness et al. (2013), a 
second question asks “In general, do you try to avoid taking risks or are you a person who is comfortable 
taking risks?” 
Traders’ cognitive abilities are assessed with a three-question Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).  
(Frederick (2005)  The three questions are: 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost?  
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 
widgets?  
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for 
the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
For each question answered correctly, the trader receives an additional $0.25 payment. 
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Table 1 reports summary statistics of trader characteristics.  We recruited 222 traders, of which 126 
were male and 96 were female.  The mean age was 21.8, and 51.8% were economics or business majors. 
In general, trader characteristics do not vary significantly across different sessions and experimental stages. 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics of Trader Characteristics 
Summary statistics of the trader characteristics by stage. Stage 1 includes multiple sessions with equal and 
unequal treatments; Stage 2 allows traders to buy shares on margin; Stage 3 introduces the Joneses effect. 
Age is the age of the trader at the time of experiment. Gender is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a trader 
is male, and 0 otherwise. No. correct in CRT is the number of questions the trader answers correctly in the 
three-question Cognitive Reflection Test based on Frederick (2005). Patience is the response of the traders 
to the following question: “Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great 
patience?”, where the most impatient equals 0 and the most patient equals 1. Econ/Business major is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the trader is an economics or business major, and 0 otherwise. 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
 Equal Unequal Equal Unequal Equal Unequal 
 N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
Age 35 23.86 5.87 41 22.88 2.62 36 20.64 1.50 36 20.31 2.42 36 21.81 4.13 36 21.50 1.73 
Gender (Female=0) 36 0.50 0.51 42 0.64 0.48 36 0.61 0.49 36 0.53 0.51 36 0.39 0.49 36 0.72 0.45 
No. correct in CRT 36 1.53 1.16 42 1.31 1.00 36 1.44 0.97 36 1.08 1.08 36 1.28 1.23 36 1.25 1.13 
Patience (Impatient=0) 36 6.81 1.69 42 5.67 2.25 36 7.08 2.17 36 6.81 1.95 36 5.64 2.37 36 6.36 2.22 
Econ/Business major 36 0.44 0.50 42 0.69 0.47 36 0.69 0.47 36 0.67 0.48 36 0.36 0.49 36 0.58 0.50 
 
To measure risk preference, traders chose one of six lotteries, and we ranked the lotteries so that Lottery 
1 was the safest and Lottery 6 was the riskiest.  The mean choice was 3.42, reflecting moderate risk-seeking.  
The mean response to the second question asking the trader to choose on a scale from 0 (risk avoidance) to 
10 (risk seeking) her willingness to take risks in general was 5.71, indicating that traders had a slightly 
greater risk taking preference than that suggested by the lottery response. 
The mean CRT score of 1.31 is similar to what previous studies have found. Frederick (2005) found a 
meant score of 1.24 after administering the CRT in 11 locations including universities, social events, and 
online. 
3. Bubble Metrics, Hypotheses and Results 
In this section, we explain the three metrics used to compare bubble dynamics.  We also state our three 
hypotheses and present the results. 
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3.1  Bubble Metrics 
We assess bubbles using three common metrics.  Amplitude is a widely used metric that measures the 
overall degree of price change, scaled by the fundamental value of the asset, throughout the life of the asset.  
(Haruvy and Noussair (2006); Huber and Kirchler (2012); Cheung et al. (2014); Andrade et al. (2015).  It 
is measured as follows: 
𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{(𝑃?̅? − 𝑓𝑡)/𝑓𝑡} − 𝑚𝑖𝑛{(𝑃?̅? − 𝑓𝑡)/𝑓𝑡} 
where 𝑃?̅?  is the mean asset price and 𝑓𝑡 is the fundamental value, both at period t. Stöckl et al. (2010) 
develop and propose two alternative bubble measures, relative absolute deviation (RAD) and relative 
deviation (RD), that better capture mispricing and overvaluation, and are less sensitive to the choice of 
parameters in the measurement.  These metrics are also widely used in the literature.  (Stöckl et al. (2015); 
Noussair and Tucker (2016)  RAD and RD are quantified as follows: 
𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
1
15
∑|𝑃?̅? − 𝐹𝑉𝑡|/|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1
 
𝑅𝐷 =
1
15
∑(𝑃?̅? − 𝐹𝑉𝑡)/|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1
 
where 𝑃?̅? is the mean asset price at period t, 𝐹𝑉𝑡 is the fundamental value at period t, and 𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean 
fundamental of the market, which is 192 in our study. 
3.2  Endowment Inequality 
H1:  Asset bubbles are larger when traders have unequal initial endowments rather than equal initial 
endowments, holding total endowment fixed. 
We hypothesize that asset bubbles will be larger in the unequal sessions relative to the equal sessions 
because the concentrated liquidity among rich traders will boost price momentum, and these effects will 
outweigh liquidity constraints among the poor traders that weaken momentum.  In the absence of leverage 
or a Joneses effect, we have no theoretical reason to believe that the concentrated liquidity effect will 
dominate the liquidity constraint effect.  Indeed, we just as easily could have presented the opposite 
 84 
 
hypothesis.  Ultimately, the outcome is empirically determined, and it may depend on the randomly 
assigned trader characteristics of the rich and poor traders. 
We test H1 in Stage 1 of the experiment, where traders have equal initial endowments in the benchmark 
sessions and unequal initial endowments in the treatment sessions.  Figure 1 shows the volume-weighted 
mean price and the mean trading volume by period of the benchmark and treatment sessions. The left panel 
shows that neither the equal nor unequal sessions produced significant bubbles relative to fundamental 
value. However, mean prices from the unequal sessions are much lower than the fundamental value during 
the first eight periods, suggesting that liquidity constraints may have dampened the price path. Consistent 
with this view, the right panel shows that mean trading volumes in the unequal sessions start out far lower 
and are less volatile across all periods than mean trading volumes in the equal sessions. 
 
Figure 1. Trading Prices and Volume of Stage 1 
Mean trading prices and the mean volume of equal and unequal markets by period for Stage 1, which 
includes multiple sessions with equal and unequal treatments. The left panel shows plots of mean prices, 
and the right panel shows plots of mean volume.  
Panel A of Table 2 report Stage 1 summary statistics of the three bubble metrics by session.  Mean 
amplitude is slightly lower in the unequal sessions, relative absolute deviation is higher, and relative 
deviation is lower, reflecting the stronger underpricing in those sessions. Panel B of Table 2 reports Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests at the session level.  We find no statistically significant difference 
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between the two treatments in terms of amplitude and RD, but the higher RAD is statistically different at 
the 5% level.  This result is consistent with the price path observed in Figure 1.  If anything, unequal initial 
endowments produce bubbles where prices are below fundamental value, consistent with weak momentum 
driven by liquidity constraints. 
Table 2.  Bubble Measures Comparison from Inequality 
Comparison of bubble measures from stage 1.   Stage 1 includes multiple sessions with equal and unequal 
treatments.  Panel A reports mean bubble measures by session. 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = max {
𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝑓𝑡
𝑓𝑡
} min {
𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝑓𝑡
𝑓𝑡
}, 
𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
1
15
∑
|𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝐹𝑉𝑡|
|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1 , and 𝑅𝐷 =
1
15
∑ (𝑃?̅? − 𝐹𝑉𝑡)/|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1 . Panel B reports Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test 
results of bubble measures between equal and unequal endowment sessions. 
Panel A: Bubble Measures 
Equal Endowments Unequal Endowments 
Session Amplitude RAD RD Session Amplitude RAD RD 
1 0.894 0.166 -0.079 1 1.422 0.495 0.069 
2 1.375 0.297 0.102 2 0.408 0.201 -0.186 
3 1.739 0.317 -0.102 3 0.989 0.358 -0.178 
4 1.075 0.269 -0.136 4 1.189 0.522 -0.394 
5 1.111 0.245 -0.188 5 1.281 0.461 -0.304 
6 1.067 0.234 -0.128 6 1.306 0.645 0.34 
    7 1.086 0.497 -0.388 
Mean 1.186 0.248 -0.091 Mean 1.121 0.463 -0.16 
 
Panel B: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test between Equal and Unequal Treatments 
 Amplitude RAD RD  
z-stat 0.000 2.286 -1.143  
P-value 1.000 0.022 0.253  
 
We also evaluate how prices deviate from the fundamental value in the two treatments. Following 
Haruvy and Noussair (2006), we test whether the mean price per period is statistically different from the 
fundamental value, and if so, in which direction. Specifically, we test if 𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 =
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 –  𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 is statistically different from 0. We find that the mean of  
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 for the equal endowment treatment is -16.95 (S.D. = 7.92, p-value = 0.035) and that the mean of 
𝐷𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑  for the unequal treatment is -28.47 (S.D. = 10.95, p-value = 0.011). These results indicate a 
significant negative deviation of price from fundamental value in both equal and unequal sessions. We test 
further, at the period level of observation, whether the price deviation from the fundamental value is 
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different between equal and unequal sessions. The results show that the price deviation differences are not 
statistically significant (T = -1.01, p-value = 0.316). 
In sum, in the absence of leverage and the Joneses effect, the unequal distribution of endowments 
among traders seems to weaken momentum effects, which makes asset bubbles where prices are 
significantly above fundamental value less likely to form.  This observation is analogous to a housing 
market where demand is weak because relatively low-wealth households do not have the savings to 
purchase homes and they have limited access to credit.  Cynamon and Fazzari (2016) argue that the high 
inequality in the U.S. economy combined with tighter borrowing constraints on the bottom 95% of 
households help explain the slow recovery from the Great Recession. 
3.3  Inequality and Leverage 
H2: Asset bubbles are larger when traders have unequal initial endowments rather than equal initial 
endowments, holding total endowment fixed, and when all traders can leverage share values by 
borrowing at a zero-interest rate from the experimenter. 
We test H2 in Stage 2 of our experiment. As in Stage 1, traders either have equal or unequal 
endowments in two different treatments, while the total endowment in the market are constant. Traders can 
borrow up to 75% of the current market value of their shareholdings, which is determined by the most 
recent trading price.  We significantly reduced the initial cash endowment from that in Session 1 to induce 
borrowing especially among poor traders. Although all traders have access to liquidity given the ability to 
buy on margin, we should observe poor traders taking on the most leverage, which relaxes liquidity 
constraints and increases the momentum effect (Day & Chen 1993).  We hypothesize that the momentum 
effect will be greater in the unequal sessions than the equal sessions because the concentration of wealth 
among the rich combined with leverage by the poor should induce more buying activity in the early rounds 
The results do not support H2.  The two charts in Figure 2 shows the volume-weighted mean price and 
the mean trading volume, respectively, by period for the two session types. From the left panel, we observe 
that mean prices from both the equal and unequal sessions show large negative bubbles relative to 
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fundamental value before period 8.  Modest bubbles emerge in both session types in later periods.  The 
right panel of Figure 2 shows that trading volume in early periods is higher in the unequal sessions as 
expected, but trading in the unequal sessions declines more sharply than trading in the equal sessions 
throughout the 15 periods. 
 
Figure 2. Trading Prices and Volume of Stage 2 
Mean trading prices and the mean volume of equal and unequal markets by period for Stage 1, which 
includes multiple sessions with equal and unequal treatments. The left panel shows plots of mean prices, 
and the right panel shows plots of mean volume. 
Bubble metrics show no statistical difference between the equal and unequal sessions in Stage 2.  Panel 
A of Table 3 reports the three bubble metrics by session.  As with Stage 1 results, unequal session means 
show lower amplitude, higher RAD, and lower RD relative to equal-session means.  Mann-Whitney-
Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests at the session level, reported in the panel B of Table 3, show no statistically 
significant differences between the two session types for all three bubble measurements.   
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Table 3.  Bubble Measures Comparison from Inequality and Leverage 
Comparison of bubble measures from stage 2. Stage 2 allows traders to buy shares on margin. Panel A 
reports mean bubble measures by session. 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = max {
𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝑓𝑡
𝑓𝑡
} min {
𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝑓𝑡
𝑓𝑡
}, 𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
1
15
∑
|𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝐹𝑉𝑡|
|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1 , 
and 𝑅𝐷 =
1
15
∑ (𝑃?̅? − 𝐹𝑉𝑡)/|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1 . Panel B reports Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test results of bubble measures 
between equal and unequal endowment sessions. 
Panel A: Bubble Measures 
Equal Endowments Unequal Endowments 
Session Amplitude RAD RD Session Amplitude RAD RD 
1 2.060 0.549 0.303 1 2.272 0.288 0.061 
2 2.429 0.206 -0.188 2 0.945 0.553 -0.226 
3 0.082 0.584 -0.463 3 0.422 0.608 -0.400 
4 0.865 0.420 0.047 4 0.421 0.679 -0.562 
5 0.996 0.553 -0.388 5 0.729 0.824 -0.643 
6 1.829 0.468 0.196 6 1.085 0.532 -0.124 
Mean 1.039 0.498 -0.160 Mean 0.756 0.654 -0.420 
Panel B: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test between Equal and Unequal Treatments 
 Amplitude RAD RD  
z-stat -0.160 1.441 -1.281  
P-value 0.873 0.150 0.200  
 
Based on the period-level observations, prices do not significantly deviate from fundamental value in 
the equal endowment sessions (T = -1.313, p-value = 0.193), but they do deviate from fundamental value 
in the unequal sessions (T = -4.630, p-value = 0.000). The cross-treatment T-test indicates that the prices 
are statistically significant between the two session types, where both types exhibit negative bubbles, but 
unequal sessions have significantly lower prices than the equal sessions (T = -4.003, p-value = 0.000). 
We conclude, unexpectedly, that asset markets that combine unequal initial endowments with leverage 
do not produce larger bubbles than asset markets that combine equal initial endowments with leverage. 
3.3  Inequality, Leverage and the Joneses Effect 
H3: Asset bubbles are larger when: (i) traders have unequal initial endowments rather than equal 
initial endowments, holding total endowment fixed; (ii) traders can leverage share by borrowing at a 
zero-interest rate from the experimenter; and (iii) traders are incentivized to purchase shares in the 
early rounds by a “Keeping up with the Joneses” effect. 
Stage 3 of the experiment tests H3.  The only difference between Stage 2 and Stage 3 is that the 
experimenter enters the trading room after periods 1 and 3 and recognizes the person(s) with the highest 
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shares, who then receives a round of applause by other traders.  Relative to equal sessions, we expect 
unequal sessions to produce bigger bubbles because poor traders who begin with 3 shares will observe wide 
gaps between their own asset holdings and the top asset holder who is surely a rich trader that began with 
9 shares.  The gaps between traders will be smaller in the equal sessions because each trader begins with 6 
shares, so the Joneses effect will be smaller. 
In support of H3, we do observe significant bubbles in Stage 3, especially in the unequal sessions, 
which contrasts sharply with Stage 2 results.  The mean price trend and trading volume of the two session 
types are exhibited in Figure 3. The bubble pattern is obvious. The left panel shows that the unequal sessions 
produce a higher mean price in 14 of 15 periods.  The right panel shows that the unequal sessions produce 
a higher trading volume in 9 of 15 periods, especially during the middle part of the session when the bubble 
grows most dramatically. 
Figure 3. Trading Prices and Volume of Stage 3 
Mean trading prices and the mean volume of equal and unequal markets by period for Stage 3, which adds 
the Joneses effect. The left panel shows plots of mean prices, and the right panel shows plots of mean 
volume. 
 
We report the bubble metrics and comparison tests for Stage 3 in Table 4.  Summary statistics in Panel 
A shows that all three metrics are higher for the unequal session than the equal sessions, and both session 
types have positive bubbles as shown by the positive value of RD.  Panel B reports the Mann-Whitney-
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Wilcoxon Rank-Sum tests at the session level.  The difference in amplitude between the unequal and equal 
sessions is statistically significant at the 5% level, and the difference in RD is statistically significant at the 
10% level. 
Table 4.  Bubble Measures Comparison from Inequality, Leverage and the Joneses Effect 
Comparison of bubble measures from stage 3.  Stage 3 adds the Joneses effect. Panel A reports mean bubble 
measures by session. 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = max {
𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝑓𝑡
𝑓𝑡
} min {
𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝑓𝑡
𝑓𝑡
} , 𝑅𝐴𝐷 =
1
15
∑
|𝑃𝑡̅̅̅−𝐹𝑉𝑡|
|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1 , and 𝑅𝐷 =
1
15
∑ (𝑃?̅? − 𝐹𝑉𝑡)/|𝐹𝑉̅̅ ̅̅ |
15
𝑡=1 . Panel B reports Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test results of bubble measures between 
equal and unequal endowment sessions. 
Panel A: Bubble Measures 
Equal Endowments Unequal Endowments 
Session Amplitude RAD RD Session Amplitude RAD RD 
1 1.509 0.287 -0.239 1 2.370 0.071 0.022 
2 1.853 0.387 0.207 2 5.460 1.332 1.159 
3 2.276 0.609 0.005 3 1.939 0.376 0.221 
4 2.230 0.442 -0.353 4 2.714 0.502 0.147 
5 1.665 0.993 0.932 5 3.027 0.740 0.390 
6 3.693 0.076 0.028 6 8.281 1.383 1.232 
Mean 2.269 0.409 0.021 Mean 3.240 0.559 0.376 
Panel B: Wilcoxon Rank-sum Test between Equal and Unequal Treatments 
 Amplitude RAD RD  
z-stat 2.082 0.801 1.761  
P-value 0.037 0.423 0.078  
 
The period-level T-test for the equal and unequal sessions shows statistically significant price deviation 
from fundamental value (T = 4.885, p-value = 0.000). In contrast, the equal treatment does not exhibit 
statistically significant price deviation from fundamental value (T = 1.379, p-value = 0.171).  The cross-
treatment T-test indicates that differences in prices are statistically significant between the two treatments, 
and the unequal sessions have significantly higher mean prices than the equal sessions (T = 3.2100, p-value 
= 0.002). 
In sum, Stage 3 results show that unequal endowments combined with leveraging and the Joneses effect 
create significantly greater bubbles than when equal endowments combine with leveraging and the Joneses 
Effect.   
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3.4 Bubble Formation Analysis 
Taken together, results from the three stages of our experiment suggest that social status plays a strong 
role in facilitating asset bubbles.  Adding the Keeping up with the Joneses incentive in Stage 3 produced 
statistically significant positive bubbles relative to the negative bubbles observed in Stages 1 and 2 . 
We can better understand how social status affects bubble formation by directly comparing stages 2 
and 3.  If the Joneses effect is strong, we would expect poor traders to buy more assets relative to rich 
traders in early periods compared with markets with no Joneses effect.  Panels A and B of Figure 4 plot 
mean buy volumes by period separately for rich and poor traders for stages 2 and 3, respectively.  Panel A 
shows that when the Joneses effect is absent, rich traders consistently buy more shares than poor traders.  
In Panel B, however, poor traders on average buy more shares than rich traders in 10 of 15 periods.  Similar 
effects exist from the sellers’ side. Panel C shows that in the absence of the Joneses effect, rich traders 
consistently sell more shares than poor traders.  Panel D shows that when the Joneses effect is introduced, 
poor traders more actively sell shares in 6 of 15 periods.  We conclude that bubbles are partly driven by 
higher asset demand by poor traders. 
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Figure 4.  Trading Volume in Stages 2 and 3 
Figure 4 plots the mean trading volume by period in Stages 2 and 3. Panels A and B plots the mean trading 
volume by buyer types in Stages 2 and 3, respectively. Panels C and D plots the mean trading volume by 
seller types in Stages 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
We further compare the borrowing patterns of the high and low endowed traders in Stages 2 and 3. If 
the Joneses Effect is strong, we would expect poor traders to borrow more frequently than the rich traders 
in the environment where the Joneses Effect is present. Figure 5 plots the mean number of traders that have 
a net borrowing at the end of each periods by trader endowment types. The left panel shows the plots for 
Stage 2 and the right one shows those for Stage 3. It is obvious that in stage 3, the number of borrowing 
traders are similar most of the time between rich and poor. However in Stage 3, there are consistently more 
poor borrowers than rich borrowers starting from period 4, the period following the two recognitions of the 
trader with the highest number of shares. Note that, when the trader is still in net borrowing position by the 
end of the 15 periods, he is considered as having a bankruptcy, as all shares become worthless at that 
moment. Figure 5 shows that there are more bankruptcy occurs for poor traders in Stage 3 than in Stage 2, 
indicating a more aggressive borrowing behavior for the poor traders in Stage 3 that results in more financial 
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instability by the end of the trading. We therefore conclude that the bubbles are also partially driven by the 
excessive borrowing behavior of the poor traders when the Joneses Effect is present. 
Figure 5.  Number of Borrowers in Stages 2 and 3 
Figure 5 plots the mean number of net borrowers in Stages 2 and 3. The left panel shows the mean number 
of net borrowers in Stage 2, and the right panel shows that in Stage 3. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Literature has shown that leveraged real estate bubbles have become more frequent, increasing financial 
instability and imposing extensive damage on economies. Also, low- and middle-income households are 
increasingly prone to over-indebtedness and default on credit cards, housing, and auto loans. Part of the 
reason is because wealth inequality in the U.S. and many other countries has increased over the last couple 
decades, and the poor households want to keep up with the living standards and social class with their 
relatively rich neighbors, which is so-called “keeping up with the Joneses.” Hence, the poor households 
may end up with buying a house by taking on too much debt, which eventually causes greater asset bubbles 
and financial instability. In a lab setting, we test how wealth inequality, borrowing, and “keeping up with 
the Joneses” effect influence asset bubbles. We recruit undergraduate students to trade assets in a computer 
lab, and subsequently study the trading results. We find that wealth inequality alone does not result in 
different asset bubble dynamics relative to markets with equal initial endowments. Instead, it is the wealth 
inequality, combining with leveraging and “keeping up with the Joneses” effect that creates asset bubbles. 
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Additionally, we observe that the low endowment traders are more active in trading and are more aggressive 
in borrowing when the Joneses effect is present, and this partially contributes to the asset bubbles. 
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